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## Content analysis of Morskoy Sbornik: 1978-1982

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






# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



## THESIS

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF MORSKOY SBORNIK:  
1978-1982

by

Jon Joseph Azzarello

September 1983

Thesis Advisor:

R. Bathurst

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second, to serve as a forum for debate; and third, to disseminate useful information.

Next, Morskoy Sbornik is compared and contrasted to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Differences result because Proceedings is a private organization whereas Morskoy Sbornik is an official organ of the Soviet Union, which serves the purposes of the state.

Last, the paper examines writings in Morskoy Sbornik on three topics to define Soviet viewpoints from what is published. The three topics examined are: the maritime threat; command and control in the Soviet Navy; and the commanding officer.



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Content Analysis of Morskoy Sbornik: 1978-1982

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy  
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
September 1983





## ABSTRACT

This paper is an analysis of Morskoy Sbornik with an emphasis on history, missions and Soviet perceptions. First there is a discussion of Morskoy Sbornik's history, starting with the Czarist period and then following it through the period of the October Revolution.

Following this is an examination of Morskoy Sbornik's missions which are: first, to foster a unity of views; second, to serve as a forum for debate; and third, to disseminate useful information.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Morskoy Sbornik with an emphasis on history, missions and Soviet perceptions. First there will be a discussion of Morskoy Sbornik's history, starting with its beginning during the Czarist period and then following it through the period of the October Revolution. Since Morskoy Sbornik was one of a very few military journals which survived the transition to the Soviet period, this will provide a picture of its development and use.

Following this will be an examination of Morskoy Sbornik's missions, which are: first, to foster a unity of views; second, to serve as a forum for debate; and third, to disseminate useful information. Examples of how the missions are being satisfied will be cited.

Next, in order to put matters in cultural perspective, Morskoy Sbornik will be compared and contrasted to the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Comparing and contrasting the two provides greater insight into how the Soviet Navy uses this journal.

Last will be an attempt to define some Soviet viewpoints from what they publish in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik. The magazine contains articles indicative of Soviet naval thought on important topics.





## II. HISTORY OF MORSKOY SBORNIK

### A. CZARIST PERIOD

Over 135 years ago, one of the oldest professional magazines in the Soviet Union, Morskoy Sbornik, began publication. On the occasion of the journal's 130th anniversary, Morskoy Sbornik published an article by Vice Admiral Shchedrin depicting the magazine's colorful history.

Shchedrin stated that Morskoy Sbornik was founded on the initiative of a group of leading Russian naval officers, led by Vice Admiral F. Litke. Vice Admiral Litke was a famous scientist and navigator, Chairman of the Naval Science Committee, and founder of the Russian Geographic Society. Morskoy Sbornik's program was personally written by Vice Admiral Litke; the first issue appeared in St. Petersburg in March, 1848, in an edition of 400 copies. From another article published in the same anniversary issue, Vice Admiral V. Solov'yev quoted the Naval Science Committee's objective in publishing the magazine was: "To see to the dissemination of useful information among those serving in the fleet" [Ref. 1].

Vice Admiral Shchedrin stated in his 130th anniversary article that Morskoy Sbornik was founded during a time of the fleet's transition from sail to steam power. This was



a period of new discoveries and innovations in maritime sciences and technology. A speaker to the USSR Academy of Sciences on the journal's 75th anniversary was quoted as saying:

In its pages appeared not only naval affairs and technology in the broad sense, not only science in the general: in the very first decade of its existence, it became one of the most prominent exponents of the literature and social thought which had begun to be so powerfully expressed as a prelude to the great era of reform. Morskoy Sbornik soon found its way into the most remote and provincial corners of Russia, having become one of the most popular magazines" [Ref. 2].

As the first naval monthly magazine in Russia, it published articles on foreign navies and naval bases, wars and incidents at sea, on voyages of individual ships and squadrons, and many other maritime subjects. Morskoy Sbornik became more and more popular as it was well received by readers. However, the first five years it remained just another departmental publication with a circulation of 1200 copies and consisting of five or six pages.

Shchedrin wrote that Morskoy Sbornik earned its popularity during the period of the Crimean War, 1853-1856, and in the ten-year period that followed. With its brilliant victory at Sinop Bay, the Black Sea Fleet opened hostilities. A model of the aggressive attack tactics of Nakhimov and his pupils was demonstrated at this last great battle of sailing fleets. The magazine gave detailed accounts of combat actions which took place not only in this battle but in all naval theaters.



Morskoy Sbornik is also cited by Shchedrin as the most complete source of information for people of that time concerning military actions in the Crimea, the Baltics, Berents and White Seas, and about the defense of Petropavlovsk-in-Kamchatka.

Against a background of universal repression and sinister silence, the role played by Morskoy Sbornik in the history of Russian journalism and public opinion takes on special significance. The uncommon voice of truth was heard in the pages of this "bureaucratic magazine" [Ref. 3].

The other Russian publications were forbidden even to reprint the occasional news dispatches published in the military newspaper Russkiy Invalid until mid-1855. Morskoy Sbornik's circulation and readership soared; it was only natural that the magazine sold out moments after being released. News from the front and the fleets printed in it was copied by hand and circulated around the country for a long time afterward.

A first during the Czarist period was Morskoy Sbornik's publication of casualty lists without regard to military rank and its description of the courageous deeds of war heroes and printing of their biographies, both officers' and enlisted seamen's.

The article goes on to state that prominent men of the time paid high tribute to such journalism and that N. Chernyshevskiy spoke highly of

. . . the annals of the defense of Sevastopol, depicting clearly the life of the Russian fighting man dying for





the Motherland and the life of the ordinary Russian in general [Ref. 4].

In reference to the feature stories on rank-and-file heroes which appeared in the magazine, Chernyshevskiy wrote:

Courageous defenders of the various strongholds of the Naval Establishment, your names have not remained obscure; they are recorded in the chronicle of that siege, which thanks to your boundless valor obliged our very enemies themselves to acknowledge the prowess of the Russian fighting man [Ref. 5].

Although averting military disaster on land and at sea, Russia was unable to avoid defeat in the War. This aroused discontentment throughout the armed forces and the country and intensified the crisis of the serf system. The Czarist government was compelled to resort to political maneuvering, a show of liberalism, and relaxation of censorship restrictions, of which Morskoy Sbornik took maximum advantage.

Vice Admiral Shchedrin quoted F. Veselago, a famous naval historial, as saying:

[It] made itself a living organ, presenting truthfully the state of naval affairs in Russia and addressing itself . . . in considerable measure to important matters of state; it attracted as contributors some very fine scientists and men of letters. Wide publicity, replacing bureaucratic secrecy in the Navy Ministry, evoked in Morskoy Sbornik free discussion and heated controversy . . . . [Ref. 6].

The magazine's progressive line was strongly approved by many famous writers and thinkers in Russia. The editors secured an excellent staff of writers and did not restrict them to particular subjects. Morskoy Sbornik first printed



"Frigate PALLADA," which was the travel essays of I. Goncharov, who was the magazine's special correspondent on V. Putyatin's expedition. Shchedrin thinks that many of Goncharov's ideas have not lost their relevance even today:

At sea . . . one can expect nothing but danger of one kind or another but courage is innate in man; one must rouse it in oneself and call on it for help, in order to conquer the tendency of the soul to be timid, and in order to steel the nerves by force of habit. And how great is the reward! A long voyage fills the memory and the imagination with marvelous pictures and significant episodes, and enriches the mind with visual knowledge of all the things one has known only by hearsay [Ref. 7].

The magazine published many sea stories and essays on sea voyages, some of them written by the magazine's correspondents on special assignment to Russian ships. Stories from other sources were also published; "Travel Notes of a Russian Seaman," the diaries of Ivan Lykov, a seaman of the 9th Naval Barracks, which he kept during a cruise, were printed in 1861. Morskoy Sbornik also printed many articles and essays written by prominent Russian writers, scientists, pedagogues, seafarers and social activists.

Shchedrin notes that many difficult and vital issues were commented on by Morskoy Sbornik. The magazine supported the elimination of corporal punishment of servicemen, the reorganization of the training, education and jurisprudence systems. It also criticized procedures based on serfdom in the army and navy. As the magazine's popularity grew, so did its circulation; by 1854 it reached 6000 copies. This figure



was quite remarkable for that time; it even surpassed the circulation of Sovremennik, which was considered the most progressive and widely read magazine of its time. "Morskoy Sbornik had subscribers in 70 Russian cities and in many foreign countries" [Ref. 8].

Morskoy Sbornik was attracting wide public attention and ranked among the most progressive publications of that time.

Shchedrin points out that, besides social-political subjects, many professional subjects were discussed in the magazine, the transition from sail to steam, from wood to metal, from smooth-bore to rifled guns. G. Butakov, the founder of "steam tactics," wrote several articles for the magazine. Shchedrin quotes from an article in Morskoy Sbornik concerning steam frigates in action during the Crimean War:

. . . with their wartime combat exploits in the defense of Sevastopol, they not only taught us how and with what steam-powered ships can and should provide support for ground forces during joint operations . . . but they also demonstrated to us that such a high-minded spirit of unity between a state's land and naval forces can accomplish wonders . . . . [Ref. 9].

Vice Admiral Shchedrin states that the Czarist government did not look kindly on the progressive nature of the magazine. As Russia's internal situation became more stable and the wounds inflicted by the war healed, the Czarist regime reverted to its old ways. The government began to censor Morskoy Sbornik to keep it under control. There were even attempts to close the magazine on the pretext that it was





"unprofitable." But its readers came to its rescue and it continued to publish, although it had to avoid controversial social-political subjects.

Besides addressing important problems of naval strategy, it became a platform for the dissemination of combat experience at sea, knowledge relating to seafaring, shipbuilding, the utilization of ordnance and the operation of machinery. Articles appeared by famous admirals and other officers, including S. Makarov, G. Butakov, I. Likhachev and A. Popov; engineers S. Dzhevelskiy, I. Bubanov and A. Krylov; and specialists in ordnance and in history. Morskoy Sbornik has been referred to as a unique naval encyclopedia of that period.

Vice Admiral Solov'yev's article notes that the work of Vice Admiral S. Makarov was published in several issues of the magazine in 1897. Makarov's "Thoughts on Some Questions of Naval Tactics" proved to be an enormous contribution to the development of Russian thinking on military theory.

Morskoy Sbornik also printed many articles concerning the experience of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, as well as World War I.

## B. SOVIET PERIOD

During the period of the Revolution, the printed word underwent radical reforms . . . . The Revolution advanced new goals, pointed the way to new tasks. Those who refused to understand this found themselves shunted aside; the Soviet authorities settled their fate with a



short obituary . . . . In this way many of the old military magazines and almost all newspapers ceased to exist . . . . Having secured for itself moral support and ideological leadership, Morskoy Sbornik . . . cheerfully joined . . . the ranks of Soviet military-scientific thought" [Ref. 10].

Vice Admiral Shchedrin points out that Morskoy Sbornik was one of a very few Russian military journals which joined the side of the Soviet Revolution without hesitation. The magazine printed the edicts of the Soviet authorities and helped them to fight other organs of the press which stood in their way.

In discussing those early days of the Revolution, Shchedrin remarks that everything was in short supply, not just food but also paper, printer's ink, skilled journalists and printers. However, essentials which were needed for those who were "serving the Revolution" were found. Morskoy Sbornik was concerning itself with the development of Soviet naval thinking, the theoretical basis of which was the writings and practical activity of Lenin on the construction and leadership of the Soviet Army and Navy.

According to Shchedrin, on 29 November 1917, Morskoy Sbornik was placed under the control of the Naval General Staff. S. P. Lukashevich was appointed its first editor-in-chief.<sup>1</sup> The Communist Party put the magazine at the service

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<sup>1</sup>S. P. Lukashevich, former NCO and radiotelegrapher on the destroyer VSADIK, editor-in-chief of Morskoy Sbornik, 1918-1919 and 1923-1926.



of the Soviet Fleet which was created to defend the gains of the working class.

The magazine published the decrees of the Soviet authorities, orders of the naval command, and news on the revolutionary movement in the fleet. News of the civil war was reported; an account was given of the Baltic Fleet's Arctic cruise in 1918 and of actions by Soviet river and lake flotillas. Morskoy Sbornik printed articles on military-political subjects, on naval strategy, on foreign navies and their performance in the World War. Morskoy Sbornik played an important part in shaping the views of Soviet officers.

In the years 1922-1929, a great deal was accomplished by the magazine, especially after the decision of the 10th RKPb (Bolshevik) Congress and the 9th All-Russian Congress of Soviets on fleet construction. Shchedrin quotes E. Pantserzhanskiy, the Assistant for Naval Affairs to the Commander-in-Chief of All the Armed Forces of the Republic, and V. Zof, Commisar of Naval Forces of the Republic, stated in 1923:

The Morskoy Sbornik of today, casting off routine and striding boldly ahead, is blazing new trails of scientific research for construction of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet [Ref. 11].

The Shchedrin article goes on to say that Morskoy Sbornik, in accordance with the missions assigned to the Navy by the Party at the 10th RKPb (Bolshevik) Congress, set up its own program and published it in the last issue of 1926. It stated that the missions of the magazine would be:



Elucidation and development of naval political subjects and matters of reconstituting the naval forces of the USSR; exploration of the most important problems of naval strategy, tactics and organization as they stand today; working out problems of USSR naval defense and of joint Army-Navy operations; discussion of the naval education, instruction and training of naval personnel; study of the combat and organizational experience of the imperialist and civil wars at sea; discussion of the latest developments in naval technology; systematic reporting of information on the state and development of the naval forces of foreign states; and a survey of the latest naval and military literature, both Russian and foreign [Ref. 12].

The magazine, as noted by Vice Admiral Shchedrin, began to devote attention to the development of the new science of operations. Considerable space was given to the analysis of the combat activity of river flotillas during the civil war, and to study of the potential of fleet support to the seaward flank of ground forces, stressing the coordination of all forces involved in an operation.

The problems discussed by Morskoy Sbornik in those days were often "coastal" in nature because, according to Shchedrin, the pre-war Navy was supposed to perform primarily defensive missions in close coordination with ground forces. But, as World War II grew closer, there began to appear more and more often articles on the tactics of submarines, naval aviation, battleships and cruisers, against enemy lines of communication near enemy bases and in combat on the high seas.

Vice Admiral Solov'yev's article noted that the magazine called upon Soviet seamen-scientists to develop a Soviet





naval strategy based on Marxist-Leninist methodology and teachings on war and armed forces. Western naval theories, especially the Mahan-Kolombos theory of sea power, were subjected to sharp criticism.

Solov'yev further notes that these calls were not left unanswered. From the articles being published, it was obvious that Soviet naval operational strategy was developing and staking out a position midway between strategy and tactics. Such ideas had never existed before and still do not exist in western military and naval strategic thinking.

By the start of World War II, according to Solov'yev, Soviet naval theory was considered to be well advanced. During the war and post-war period, Morskoy Sbornik did a great deal to generalize and disseminate combat experience. A series of articles by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union I. Isakov, "The Navy of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War," served to generalize material on all of the great events of the war at sea. There was also quite a number of serious articles generalizing war experience which were written by the principal department heads of the Soviet Naval Academy.

The Vice Admiral Shchedrin pieces point out that Morskoy Sbornik also published information on enemy ordnance, technology, tactics, and on the operations of the allied navies. The rule "studying what was needed in the war" was scrupulously



followed by the magazine. Applying this rule, articles were published which analyzed battles and operations, tactics and organization, inter-branch operations and many other subjects of military science.

According to Shchedrin, Morskoy Sbornik is credited with helping Soviet officers acquire the knowledge and skills needed for educational work on long ocean cruises and the capability to maintain a high state of combat readiness. The magazine's efforts are focused on these difficult tasks.

In 1973 the Navy Military Council ordered the celebration of the magazine's 125th birthday. Shchedrin states that most of the national newspapers in the Soviet Union commented on its jubilee. Morskoy Sbornik was awarded an Honor Certificate by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 5 March 1973 for its services in the field of communist education of Soviet naval personnel.

The magazine has popularized literature having to do with ships, seas and oceans. It has shown how the history of the fleet can be reflected in commemorative propaganda. Incidentally, for its well-presented commemorative propaganda . . . Morskoy Sbornik has been awarded the Diploma, 1st Class, of the Central Council of All-Russian Society for Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments; and for its effective propaganda on the achievements of science and technology, it has been awarded the bronze medal of VDNKh (Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy) [Ref. 13].

In conclusion, Vice Admiral Shchedrin notes that Morskoy Sbornik's popularity continues to grow. In the past ten years, its circulation has more than doubled. This is because its editorial staff is responsive to the reader's needs and does everything possible to accomplish its mission.



### III. MISSIONS OF MORSKOY SBORNIK

Morskoy Sbornik appears to have three basic missions. First, and probably most important, is to foster a unity of views on the character and form of waging a future war at sea. Second is a forum for discussion and debate of important issues of naval theory. And third is the dissemination of useful information which will allow them to further improve the combat readiness of the Soviet Navy. Since the magazine is an official press organ, these missions and the program to accomplish them has met with the approval of the CPSU and Navy General Staff.

This section will discuss each of the basic missions, explaining their importance in terms of Soviet political culture and will cite examples of how the magazine is attempting to accomplish each mission. Concluding this section will be an evaluation of Morskoy Sbornik's program to meet its requirements.

#### A. UNITY OF VIEWS

Soviet Navy training, as in all the Soviet armed forces, is permeated with political ideology. Soviet military doctrine is developed from military science which, in turn, is based upon Marxist-Leninist teachings and the experience of wars. Soviet military science also uses the results of research from the technical, natural and social sciences





for developing new means of warfare and supporting combat operations.

Intensive political indoctrination is an essential part of Soviet naval training. For the enlisted ranks, the indoctrination involves patriotic lectures (usually on World War II), emphasizing points relevant to current training; current events in a Marxist-Leninist perspective; and updates on Party activities. However, for officers, this indoctrination is intended to teach the applications of Marxist-Leninist methods of military-scientific analysis and development of standard solutions for any given combat situation. This direct relationship between military science and political ideology provides the basis for the unity of views which is of utmost concern to the Soviet military leadership. Given a specific military situation, a group of Soviet officers theoretically should be able to analyze and arrive at the same solution independently. This can facilitate planning and coordination, particularly in combat situations in which communications with friendly forces may be reduced.

These political-ideological considerations go far beyond the Marxist-Leninist immutable laws of warfare and the influence of such thought upon military decision-making. This philosophy is also reflected in the organization for political administration, which extends from the Main Political Administration at the Ministry of Defense level, though the





Main Political Directorate of the navy and political officers in individual units. This organization plays an important part in shipboard organization, personnel control mechanisms and training methods.

This view can be traced back to the political culture of the Russian village. Edward L. Keenan, in his paper, "Russian Political Culture" (Russian Research Center, Harvard University, July, 1976), states that the primary objective of the village was survival. Not the preservation of a way of life but life itself, human life, vital livestock, and crops. The difference between prosperity and disaster for the village as well as the household was precarious.

In the peasant village organization, according to Keenan, the smallest political unit was the village, not the individual or the family since they were too prone to disease or sudden calamity. In this organization the interests of all were subordinated to the village. Since all the households depended upon each other for their survival (survival of the village), when one household met with disaster, the others would come to its aid. This was a system of reciprocating mechanisms and its virtues were known to every member of the culture. They understood the importance of the village organization in terms of their own survival. In rare cases when an individual would refuse to come to another's aid, the village could beat the offender to death or burn his house (let loose the "red rooster").



Given the precarious environment they all lived in, all of the adult members would have at one time experienced the benefits of the system; and under normal circumstances would not only acquiesce but would force others to do so in their own interest.

Keenan wrote that the Russian peasant's view of man was a low one. He was fearful of man's inclination to be weak and dangerous to the vital interests of the group and consequently he treated others as well as himself in an authoritarian manner. Man's self-interest had to be controlled for the good of the village.

The paper also notes that decision making stressed the interests of the group over those of the individual. Importance was therefore attached to a corporate form of decision making. All of the village elders were both encouraged and obliged to speak openly on an issue that was to be decided. Once a decision was reached, they were required to join the majority in unanimous adherence to the policy decided upon. It was not permitted to continue partisan discussion on the issue once the group had come to a decision.

Since the present and past Soviet leadership is from Great Russian peasant stock and considering the harsh history of the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that great importance is placed upon "unity of views."



One example found in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik of fostering a unity of views is concerned with military discipline as a means to increase combat readiness. The series of articles which appear were probably generated in 1977 by the adoption of a new Constitution in the Soviet Union.

The series starts out with an article written by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov in May of 1978. Gorshkov writes that, as a result of profound qualitative change in the armed forces during the last decade and the adoption of a new Constitution in the Soviet Union, a partial revision of Navy Shipboard Regulations will soon become effective. He states:

The Navy Shipboard Regulations are a collection of immutable laws governing naval service. They represent the active experience of more than one generation of navymen, experience tried and proven in countless naval cruises and campaigns and in fierce battles and engagements, experience carefully collected, bit by bit, and included in the concise lines of articles they contain. They are the original source and basis of all manuals, handbooks, and rules developing and defining in their organization and training, as well as of the daily performance of duty and the shipboard regulations [Ref. 14].

The author is trying to establish a unity of views within the Soviet Navy by strongly emphasizing the validity and importance of Navy Shipboard Regulations. He appeals to the reader's emotions by bringing up past campaigns and battles. Gorshkov goes on to state that navy life is permeated with these regulations and that the most important



task of a ship's command is to organize all of the crew's activities in strict accordance with Navy Shipboard Regulations.

Admiral Gorshkov sums up his piece by stating:

Absolute, efficient, and precise fulfillment of the requirements of the Regulations and the organization of the daily life and activities of the Navy in full accordance with their letter and spirit will make it possible to maintain ships, units, and forces in constant combat readiness and guarantee an immediate rebuff to any aggressor [Ref. 15].

Morskoy Sbornik published another article in February, 1979, which stressed military discipline (strict adherence to regulations) as a guarantee of increased combat readiness. This article was submitted by Vice Admiral V. Sidorov, Commander of the Baltic Fleet.

The article begins with a brief discussion of Lenin's views on military discipline. V. I. Lenin considered military discipline as the key to combat readiness. Vice Admiral Sidorov writes that:

In order to win, taught our leader, iron war discipline is needed. The army of a socialist state should consist of conscientious conditioned fighting men, welded together by a unity of will and actions [Ref. 16].

Lenin urged ". . . not from fear, but from conscience, carry out all laws of the Red Army, all orders, maintain discipline in it in any way possible . . . . [Ref. 17].

The role of discipline in maintaining high combat readiness under contemporary conditions has grown immeasurably. This is due to the rapid development of combat equipment in the armed forces and changes which have occurred in their organization and means of armed conflict.





Admiral Sedorov goes on to say that the Central Committee of the CPSU has emphasized that military discipline and order is an important condition to a high state of combat readiness. He ends his article with the statement:

Military discipline is the foundation of combat readiness and a guarantee of success in carrying out the responsible missions of training and duty which face the fleet. And the more we do for the further strengthening of discipline, the more powerful and combat capable our fleet's ranks will be [Ref. 18].

Vice Admiral A. Plekhanov, Chief of the Political Branch of the Naval Base and Naval Schools in Leningrad, wrote an article which was printed in September, 1980. This article also begins with a discussion of Lenin's views on military discipline. Vice Admiral Plekhanov states that Lenin had declared war on anything that undermines discipline in the armed forces and that he (Lenin) demanded absolute efficiency, precision and self-discipline in the execution of orders and instructions.

The article states that the CPSU, in its efforts to increase the Soviet Union's defensive capabilities, is guided by Lenin's views on military discipline. The CPSU is doing everything possible to ensure "that the Soviet Armed Forces are a precise, well-coordinated organism with a high degree of organization and discipline . . . ." [Ref. 19].

Vice Admiral Plekhanov is also fostering a unity of views. He is stressing the point that everyone must be precise in the execution of orders because that is the only way to



increase the combat readiness and efficiency of the Soviet Navy.

A fourth and final article used in this particular example to link military discipline with combat readiness is an editorial that was published by Morskoy Sbornik in October, 1981.

This article begins with some of Lenin's views on military discipline. A fundamental Leninist principle of Soviet military construction is conscientious and firm military discipline. Lenin saw the significance of discipline primarily in that it knits fighting men into a single combat organism and coordinates their actions and thereby multiplies their power.

The force of a hundred, according to a figure of speech of Lenin's, can exceed the force of a thousand if the hundred is organized and joined by a unity of will [Ref. 20].

Today, because the development and employment of new weapons requires great coordination between large numbers of servicemen, the importance of military discipline has grown manifold. The article also states:

Discipline is not only a most important condition for victory in battle, but also the foundation of the constant combat readiness of naval forces in peace time. Achieving the goal that each sub-element, each ship and each unit be a model of strict adherence to order and the rules established by Soviet laws and military regulations is one of the central tasks of commanding officers, staffs, political organs, and party organizations [Ref. 21].



The rest of the article discusses how political organs can help the commanding officer and his staff to achieve increased military discipline. The term "unity of views" is used repeatedly.

The articles cited in this example have several common factors that link them together. First, authorship of the articles certainly adds to their credibility and importance to the readers. Writings by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov, Vice Admiral V. Sidorov, Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral A. Plekhanov, Chief of the Political Branch of the Naval Base and Naval Schools in Leningrad and an article by the editorial staff of Morskoy Sbornik are impressive and would attract the attention and close scrutiny of the readership. If comparable men in the U.S. Navy (Chief of Naval Operations, Commander-in-Chief of a Fleet, etc.) published pieces on a particular subject, that would attract great attention.

A degree of emotion and intensity was inherent in the articles because of phrases and ideological references used. Each of the articles referred to Lenin's views on military discipline which gives the main topic an ideological basis. Gorshkov's article also draws upon the victorious battles of the Russian Navy, "fires of the revolution" and the "glorious sailors of October" for added intensity.

Certain phrases, some exactly alike and others closely worded, are used throughout the writings cited. The phrase



"unity of will" is used in two of the articles; Vice Admiral Sidorov uses it and it is used again by the editorial staff of Morskoy Sbornik. This is a very powerful phrase because its concept goes back to the political culture of the Russian village, as discussed earlier. Lenin, as quoted earlier, even writes of the concept. Admiral Gorshkov also uses a very similar phrase, "inseparable unit." He uses it in reference to the conduct of all organizational activities.

Phrases like "strict adherence to orders and rules" and "precision in execution of orders and instructions" are used throughout in regard to strengthening military discipline. And this type of discipline fosters a "well coordinated organism" which is considered a requirement for the employment of modern military forces. Each article also states the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to require unswerving adherence to the requirements of the military oath and regulations.

The authors, emotion and intensity, frequency and similarity of expressions, and references to ideological/historical/political basis all make for a very powerful effort to foster a unity of views concerning the precondition of military discipline for combat readiness.

#### B. FORUM FOR DISCUSSION, DEBATE AND EXPLORATION OF IMPORTANT ISSUES

Although the second mission is treated separately, its ultimate objective is the same as the first mission--to foster





a unity of views. Because of its deep roots in Soviet political culture the concept is extremely important in the Soviet Union. Before establishing any policy, the Soviet leadership wants to ensure the validity of it. That is, it must be ultimately derived from Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which recognizes immutable laws of society and war, strict methods for analysis, and ideologically correct solutions.

In order to develop a "correct" theory, experts must be allowed to discuss and debate the issues with each other in an open way as in the Russian village organization. In this way problems and questions can be resolved using a Marxist-Leninist methodology before a doctrine is established.

In the Soviet military system the expression of unofficial views is through military science. Unlike military doctrine, which represents the official policy of the Soviet Union, differences in opinion may be expressed and at times are even encouraged. Admiral Chernavin, Chief of the Main Naval Staff, noted:

On the whole, debates on Naval theory in the pages of the Soviet Naval Digest have a great significance, since ~~from lack of unanimity~~ of opinion on many theoretical problems, serious difficulties sometimes arise in our practical activity. In addition, the solution of a whole complex of problems in Navy theory is a broad field of endeavor for naval officers, naval educational institutions and the Navy's scientific institutes [Ref. 22].

Sharp debates published in Morskoy Sbornik are rare; however, they are not unknown. Presently there is an intense



ongoing debate within the pages of the magazine. The debate began in April, 1981, with the first installment of a two-part article written by Vice Admiral K. Stalbo entitled "Some Issues of the Theory of the Development and Employment of the Navy." This article has expressed the author's views on the subject matter, content and structural pattern of the theory of naval development and employment. Vice Admiral Stalbo remarked that there is an urgent need for a systematic examination of the primary elements of this theory, for their association into a logically connected concept and for a definition of its structure and missions. This has resulted in sharp critical responses from other senior Soviet flag officers.

The first response to Vice Admiral Stalbo's article was from Rear Admiral G. Kostev in November, 1981. According to Robert Suggs in his article, "The Soviet Navy: Changing of the Guard?" (Proceedings, April, 1983), Rear Admiral Kostev is the head of the naval faculty of the Lenin Political-Military Academy. As a political officer, it has been suggested that Rear Admiral Kostev is speaking for the Navy Political Directorate and, therefore, the Communist Party. This would mean that he has opened the door for attacks on Vice Admiral Stalbo's theories.

According to Kostev, Stalbo's view of naval theory is too narrow and deals with it as if it were independent from the study of military science. In other words, naval theory



falls within the framework of a single military science. Because the branches of the Armed Forces have specific inherent features they must be viewed in a differentiated manner by theories of branches of the Armed Forces. However, it must be stressed that they fall within the framework of military science because their organizational development, preparation and employment are accomplished both independently and in cooperation with each other. Above all, providing the methodological framework for all theoretical research is the Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

Suggs notes that Stalbo has focused on combat at sea and neglected other vital areas. Naval theory must examine armed conflict not only at sea but also on the land and in the air within the framework of limits of actions by naval forces. An integrated approach is also necessary in order to determine ways of achieving a common goal for all branches of the armed forces.

Kostev does not agree with Stalbo's organization of the general part of naval theory. This general part gives the theory a logical basis; without it, the theory of the navy would appear to be a conglomerate of separate unrelated theories. Kostev's objections to Stalbo's organization can be summarized in the following statement:

It is the fundamental basis of the system of knowledge about the navy. That means it must examine only categories, patterns, and principles "nourishing" all component parts of the theory of the navy. This is the



definition of the general part which the author himself provides. In our view there is no need to include in it everything that "does not fit" within the framework of special theories. It seems to us that this leads to inaccuracy in presenting the content of the general part [Ref. 23].

He goes on to say that it is not correct to include in the general part of the theory a category such as sea power of the state. This is a very broad concept which is a component part of the state's entire might, which is examined by Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army. These are questions that should be dealt with at the highest levels of the state.

Finally, further scientific classification of the constantly growing knowledge and clarification of terminology in the theory of the Navy is needed.

Admiral V. Chernavin was the author of the second article which was critical of Vice Admiral Stalbo's two-part series. Admiral V. Chernavin is a nuclear submariner who was the North Fleet Commander until November of 1981 when he was promoted to Chief of the Main Navy Staff.

Suggs points out that Chernavin's article which appeared in January, 1982, warns that this may be a heated debate in which objective and subjective difficulties must be overcome. According to Suggs, Chernavin emphasizes the need for consideration of naval from the viewpoints of independent, combined and joint operations, which opposes Stalbo's focus on combat sea. Chernavin states:





Today, in essence, there are no particularly well-defined spheres of armed conflict. Each branch of the armed forces is capable of bringing force to bear on the enemy in whatever physical environment he may be--on land, in the air, on the water or under the water. Victory is achieved by coordinated efforts, and this gives rise to the necessity of integrating all knowledge about warfare within the framework and limits of a single, unified military science [Ref. 24].

Chernavin feels that their first concern should be the development of a more precise terminology, starting with the selection of a name for the theory dealing with study of the navy. He also states that ". . . there is not yet any unanimity of opinion on this subject" [Ref. 25]. He adds that Vice Admiral Stalbo's term "theory of the development and deployment of the Navy" is not comprehensive enough and that a number of important elements will be excluded from the systematic structure of knowledge about the navy.

Chernavin notes that an analysis of some particular problems and categories is given in Stalbo's general section on the theory of the navy. Some of these (i.e., sea supremacy, problems of balancing the navy, and national sea power) cannot be comprehensively covered in the general section alone. Part of the problem lies in the definitions used. For example, Vice Admiral Stalbo's article states:

The theory of naval strategy is a system of scientifically based, logically arranged concepts tested in practice, as well as of knowledge about the principles of training and employing naval forces in warfare at sea, during the performance of strategic, operational and tactical missions [Ref. 26].



Admiral Chernavin feels that the definition given in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia is more precise, strict, and accurate. It reads:

Naval strategy studies the nature of warfare in sea and ocean theaters of military operations and develops methods of preparing for and conducting operations and battles, both independently and in conjunction with commands (forces) of other branches of the armed forces [Ref. 27].

Suggs points out that there is also a disagreement with Stalbo's treatment of the principle of massing of forces. Chernavin states that the principle of massing of forces has acquired a new significance under today's conditions of warfare. He adds that Vice Admiral Stalbo has failed to consider the latest developments in combat capabilities, the global scale and rapid flow of combat action. The massing of forces and means is more important than ever. Because in order to guarantee the destruction of important targets in a short period of time, concentration of firepower is essential. It is further pointed out that the time factor has been completely disregarded in Stalbo's treatment of combat readiness, command, and concentration of forces. Admiral Chernavin notes that modern command, control and communications systems have expanded the capabilities of rapid organization and close coordination of joint combat operations. It is implied that Stalbo is unaware that, as the conditions and nature of war change, the content and form of principles of military and naval art must also change.



In concluding his article, Admiral Chernavin encourages the development of this debate in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik. It will serve as a good starting point for thorough discussion and objective substantiation of a theory of the navy that will reflect modern day conditions.

The third article in the debate is by Admiral V. Sysoyev, Commander of the Marshall Grechko Naval Academy, which is the highest educational institution in the Soviet Navy. This academy, as described by Suggs, is similar to a combination of the U.S. Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Center for Naval Analysis. Admiral Sysoyev is considered to be one of the Soviet Navy's leading management and command and control theorists.

Admiral Sysoyev has the same criticism as Rear Admiral Kostev and Admiral Chernavin on a number of issues. For example, he feels that Stalbo's term "the theory of development and employment of the Navy" is not comprehensive enough to properly cover the system of knowledge about the Navy. He suggests the term "naval theory" better corresponds to the broad content of knowledge being studied.

Suggs notes that Sysoyev also thinks that Stalbo's treatment of the general part of the theory is too broad because he includes problems such as sea power of the state. This is a subject that should be considered by policy makers at the national level, not the Navy.



As Chernavin had done, Sysoyev emphasized the time factor as being extremely important in both tactical and operational coordination. Paralleling Chernavin's views, he lists factors that drove the development of management theory during World War II; they included the global scope of naval operations, the role of submarines and carrier-based aviation (the most versatile fleet arms), and an increase in the importance of joint army and navy actions, especially amphibious landings.

Sysoyev says that a contemporary theory of command and control must develop as the theory of control of the Navy as a whole. Also, the theory of control of the Navy must have as a basis the laws and principles of the science of control of the Soviet state as well as on theories of control of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. This, of course, must take into consideration specific missions, organizational and employment features of the Navy. Suggs states that Sysoyev views the principle of one-man command, which he sees as computer aided, centralized decision-making, as the most important aspect of management. The freedom of independent decision-making at all levels of command is advocated.

In April, 1982, Captain 1st Rank B. Makeyev, a candidate of naval science, entered the debate with his article entitled "Some Views on the Theory of Naval Weaponry."





Part two of the Stalbo series discussed the naval armament theory. Stalbo calls the theory of naval armament the core of the theory of Navy construction.

The theory of Navy Armament works up, researches and studies the problems involved in determining the principal directions of Navy development and in creating the necessary material means for waging war in theaters of operation, including basing systems [Ref. 28].

The article supports points made by Kostev, Chernavin and Sysoyev concerning Stalbo's omission of military, political and economic factors in weapons development and his desire to have the navy assume a prominence in the Soviet defense establishment.

Makeyev believes that naval weapons development is based on decisions of defense planners who must consider the missions and need of all branches of the Armed Forces, the economic capacity of the state, and the political-strategic situation. The decisions of these planners are based on many factors external to the navy; this may alter basic mission of the Navy or any other branch.

An article by Rear Admiral V. Gulin and Captain 1st Rank Yu. Borisov appeared in July, 1982. Both authors, according to Suggs, are assigned to the Grechko Academy political faculty. The article, entitled "Methodological Problems of the Theory of Building a Navy and Employing It in Battle," attacks Vice Admiral Stalbo primarily with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Gulin and Borisov criticize Stalbo for his lack



of a Marxist-Leninist philosophy; that is, his failure to evaluate all social life, including war from the social class aspect. Vice Admiral Stalbo's failure to consider the social class aspect leads him to six basic errors.

First, certain propositions in Stalbo's article are reviewed fully from the technical and operational-technical point of view. Modern equipment and weapons constitute one of the principal factors of naval development, but not the only one. Stalbo ignores a principal driving force, the fact that world imperialism, in its preparations for warfare against the Soviet Union, is counting on naval power. It is this factor that leads to the development of sophisticated weapon systems and optimal methods of warfare. Strategic objectives are determined by politics.

Second, in his discussion of the significance of the moral factor in warfare, Stalbo completely disregards the class approach. To document his claim that moral factors in war have always been significant, he quotes historical military figures. However, according to Gulin and Borisov, military leaders of the past only had a limited understanding of the subject. Only a Marxist-Leninist view enables one to understand the true significance of the moral factor and make full use of it in war.

Third, Stalbo fails to achieve a proper balance of political and military-technical elements in his analysis of the main directions of naval development. Stalbo



accorded the theory of weapons development a predominant role in the overall development of the navy. He failed to estimate the significance of the military and military-technical policies of the Party and Soviet military doctrine.

Fourth, Stalbo fails to criticize bourgeois naval ideas. Naval problems today are considered an important part in the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism. The capitalists are trying to distort the essence and social purpose of the sea power of the Soviet state. This demands that great effort be applied toward well-supported criticism of bourgeois naval theories.

Fifth, Stalbo's treatment of naval theory as separate from other areas of military service. Military science is very complex and it is broken down into different areas which are studied by the theories of the Branches of the Armed Forces. Theory of the Navy has its own subject area determined by the peculiarities of naval combat; however, it must be studied within the framework of military science and Marxist-Leninist laws of war.

Sixth, the theory of naval education and training is given an unsuitably subordinate position. The authors feel that this is a full-fledged element of naval theory. This is because man is still the decisive force and the process of training and education permeates the entire theory of building the navy and using it in combat.





Captain 1st Rank N. Priemov's article, "The Theory of Military Training and Education--A Component Part of Naval Theory," was published in November, 1982. Captain 1st Rank Priemov, professor and doctor of naval science, who is believed to be associated with the Grechko Naval Academy, repeats the attack on Stalbo for assigning a subordinate position to the theory of military training and education. He views the theory of training and education as a major component of naval theory, equivalent to the general theory of the navy. The author states that the theory of military training and education of the navy is based on Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, the Marxist-Leninist theory of social control, the theory of military training and education of personnel of the Soviet armed forces, and naval and military art. Priemov believes that this is the proper hierarchical sequence of theories.

The importance of the party principle is cited by Priemov. It has influence on training methodology and expresses the dependence of the goals, tasks and content of training on the policies of the Communist Party, which has the leading position in the equipping and preparation of the Soviet armed forces. The party principle should be infused in all training.

Vice Admiral Stalbo's article (two-part series), "Some Issues of the Theory of the Development and Deployment of the Navy," has been attacked on several fronts by his critics.





Suggs emphasizes that these critics are powerful senior naval officers. In summary, Suggs notes, there are three serious areas of concern.

### 1. Ideological

Stalbo misunderstands the basic position of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in theories concerning the development and use of the armed forces and does not present the party principle adequately. Because of these shortcomings, he ignores the importance of the Party in setting military policy, gives an undeservedly high position to the Soviet Navy in the overall scheme of the Soviet armed forces, and treats naval theory as an independent subject. This impairs his knowledge of the development, content, and significance of military science. It also led him to incorrect explanations of naval technology, naval history and the significance of moral factors in war. He developed theories concerning sea power of the state, which should only be developed at a high national level. Furthermore, Stalbo fails to defend Soviet naval theory from the criticism of bourgeois naval experts.

### 2. Theoretical

Stalbo's term for the area of study, the theory of development and employment of the navy, has been unanimously criticized as being too narrow. Criticism has also been leveled at his organization of the fields of knowledge



within the area of naval theory, the subjects and objects in these fields and the terms and definitions used.

### 3. Operational

Stalbo's critics complain that he does not understand the principles of concentration of forces and combat readiness and has completely neglected the importance of the time factor. He fails to pay attention to joint and combined operations, focusing on combat at sea, which places him outside the mainstream of modern Soviet military science. Also, he does not understand or give proper emphasis to the factors which drive the development of command, control and communications systems. The most serious attacks concern the lack of unity of tactical and operational views. This criticism came from the operational as well as educational and research communities. Stalbo was also criticized for his lack of response to the modern conditions and nature of warfare.

This ongoing theoretical debate in Morskoy Sbornik is providing a forum for the discussion of many longstanding issues concerning the Soviet Navy. Admiral Chernavin ended his article by noting:

In conclusion we should like to emphasize that this developing debate in the pages of Soviet Naval Digest will serve as a good starting point for thorough discussion and objective substantiation of a theory of the Navy which will meet the needs of military practice and reflect the present day condition of our Navy [Ref. 29]



The ideologically correct "solution" will ultimately become doctrine and this will provide a unanimity of opinion within the Soviet Navy.

Although not as intense there is another ongoing debate within the pages of Morskoy Sbornik. This particular debate started in 1978 and centers on the use and importance of carrier forces in a modern navy. The articles are written by Vice Admiral K. Stalbo, who is closely associated with Admiral Gorshkov, and Rear Admiral Pushkin, the editor-in-chief of Morskoy Sbornik.

Stalbo, who is presumably voicing Gorshkov's views, feels that the aircraft carrier will play an important role in modern military operations. Rear Admiral Pushkin states that aircraft carriers are too vulnerable to submarines to be an important part of a modern fleet.

The debate starts with an article in the June, 1978, issue of Morskoy Sbornik, entitled "Aircraft Carriers in the Postwar Period." The author, Vice Admiral K. Stalbo discusses the role of the carriers in the United States and NATO military doctrine with special emphasis on its capability to deliver nuclear weapons. Stalbo states that carriers comprise the reserve of strategic nuclear forces in U.S. doctrine.

Stalbo also states that carriers play an important role in conventional or local wars. Stalbo states:



They have become more sophisticated, multifunctional ships capable of accomplishing practically all primary fleet missions involving the use of general-purpose forces [Ref. 30].

The article does comment on the carrier's vulnerability. Stalbo remarks that carriers are very vulnerable to submarine and air weapons. Submarines and naval air forces are still a formidable foe for carriers.

Vice Admiral Stalbo concludes his article by stressing the important role of carriers in the future. Stalbo writes:

In view there is no basis to speak of a future reduction in the importance of carriers in armed conflict at sea. Moreover, we must speak of an increase in their role in military operations [Ref. 31].

Several months later Rear Admiral A. Pushkin's "Combat Operations Against Aircraft Carriers by American and Japanese Submarines during World War II" was published in the September, 1979, issue of Morskoy Sbornik. This article is a detailed discussion of U.S. and Japanese submarine operations during the second world war.

Rear Admiral Pushkin remarks that Stalbo's article overestimated the value of the aircraft carrier. Stalbo was criticized for not devoting proper attention to the vulnerability of aircraft carriers to submarines. It was also stated that, while effective pressure was being placed on the enemy by submarines, they (submarines) essentially suffered no losses. Pushkin is stressing that the submarine is the more capable of the two.





The article goes into details of carrier survivability in combat from submarine attacks. It is revealed that the explosion of even one torpedo would be enough to disable an aircraft carrier for several months.

Throughout the article, Rear Admiral Pushkin has the effectiveness of the submarine over the vulnerability of the aircraft carrier. He concludes by calling the submarine a "primary attack force in naval warfare," including against modern carriers.

In January, 1980, the Soviet journal published "The U.S. Naval Presence and Defending the Interests of the USSR on the Oceans" by Vice Admiral Stalbo. The article's primary thrust is the examination of various ways in which the Soviet Union can protect its interests at sea. However, Stalbo takes the opportunity to comment on the importance of the aircraft carrier.

Stalbo remarks that "carrier diplomacy" has been a constant attribute of imperialist countries since President Truman. He points out that American naval forces participated in 177 of 215 conflicts (82%) in the period between 1946 and 1975. Aircraft carriers were used the greatest number of times (106 instances).

Stalbo emphasizes that aircraft carriers "were and still are the nucleus" of the naval presence and represent the principal instrument of American policy. He calls them



"the most prepared of the front-line forces, the first ones ready to inflict 'unacceptable losses' on the enemy." Stalbo is undoubtedly referring to the carrier's nuclear weapon delivery capability.

In June, 1980, Rear Admiral Pushkin's article, entitled "German Submarine Operations Against Aircraft Carriers during World War II," was published. This article examines the experience of combat employment of submarines against carriers in the Atlantic. The submarines proved themselves to be capable of successfully combating carriers.

Pushkin states that without a doubt modern submarines are a great threat to carriers. He goes on to note that a carrier with escort forces will not be an easy target. But war experience indicates that skilled operations by submarines led to the destruction of carriers even when they had a heavy escort. In this article, Pushkin stresses the vulnerability of the carrier to contemporary nuclear-powered submarines.

Appearing in the October, 1982, issue of Morskoy Sbornik is another article by Pushkin, entitled "Combat Operations of German Submarines on Sea Lanes off the East Coast of America in 1942." This article examines the use of German submarines in the conduct of special operations along the U.S. East Coast.

Unlike the previous article, in this one Pushkin does not comment on the vulnerability of carriers. Instead he



concentrates on relating the effectiveness of submarines. Pushkin not only gives accounts of the effectiveness of German submarines but also comments on modern submarines.

The author points out that modern nuclear-powered submarines' potential to disrupt shipping has increased immeasurably and that an effective capability to combat nuclear powered submarines is a long way from becoming a reality.

Stalbo is trying to present a convincing argument that aircraft carriers can and will play an important role in modern naval warfare. It seems likely that Admiral Gorshkov, with whom Stalbo is closely related, wants to increase the role of the carrier in the Soviet Navy. Should Stalbo's argument win, the Soviet Navy will probably see more KIEV class vessels and eventually a large-deck (U.S. style) carrier.

However, if Pushkin wins the debate, resources will be allocated to submarine forces. Even if Pushkin should lose, it is inconceivable that submarines will not continue to play an important role in the Soviet Navy. Soviet SSBN's are considered a strategic nuclear reserve, a vital part of the Soviet warfighting concept; and SSN's are used in direct support of SSBN's.

In both examples presented, a unity of views is goal sought. The Soviet leadership must ensure the validity



of any doctrine before adopting it. Experts are given the opportunity to openly discuss the issues in order to resolve all of the associated problems. Once this is completed, a unity of views and doctrine can be established.

#### C. DISSEMINATION OF USEFUL INFORMATION

A third function of Morskoy Sbornik is the dissemination of useful information that will assist Soviet seamen in the performance of their duties. Because of the significantly increased complexity of equipment, armaments and tactics, Soviet navymen require a high level of technical knowledge to maintain combat readiness.

Fleet Admiral N. Sergeyev noted that Morskoy Sbornik aids officers and readers to utilize the experience of the best so that they themselves acquire skills more quickly. Admiral Sergeyev wrote this when he was Chief of Staff of the Soviet Navy for the March, 1973, Morskoy Sbornik in an article entitled "Friend and Advisor of the Naval Officer." In the same article, Admiral Sergeyev commented that the Soviet Navy has become a nuclear-powered and missile-carrying navy and has emerged into the world oceans. Also, he noted that shipboard officers, the magazine's main readers, are carrying out important missions on long cruises. Therefore, Morskoy Sbornik must aid these officers to become enlightened naval officers more rapidly.





A large amount of reference information is published in the journal. One example of this type of information is the "Changes in Maritime Law" articles that are published. As various countries around the world change the limits on their territorial and economic zone, the magazine informs its readers of these changes. This information is of obvious importance for navigation, especially in such relatively restricted waters as the Baltic Sea. Five of these articles appeared in Morskoy Sbornik between January and October of 1982.

There are also regular articles entitled "Test Your Knowledge of Rules for Prevention of Collisions at Sea." This series appeared at the request of the readers in a question and answer form. The purpose of these articles is to assist officers of naval ships who are standing underway watch on the bridge to assimilate better and reinforce knowledge of the International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea and to ensure that they are understood and applied at sea.

Under the category of "Ordnance and Technology" are many articles of practical use to the technical specialists. The officers of the engineering departments are reported to frequently refer to material published in this section. Published are articles such as "Charging a Lead-Acid Storage Battery by the Optimum-Voltage Method" by B. Romanenko and



"Peculiarities of Operating Helicopters in the Summer"  
by O. Savchuk.

These articles are very technical and provide detailed information. Information on United States and western weapon systems are also published under this category as well as under "Foreign Navies." There is a great deal of focus on U.S. systems and the degree of detail is high.

"Attention: Tomahawk!" by Captain 1st Rank B. Rodianov and Senior Lieutenant Engineer N. Novichkev, published in May, 1980, is a good example. This article gives detailed information on its navigation equipment, flight profile, employment tactics and different launch versions of the Tomahawk cruise missile.

Articles on many other topics are also published. These include subjects such as navigation, tactics of foreign navies, training methods, etc. Anything that is deemed useful to the officers and men of the Soviet Navy is liable to be published. Because of the large number of "informative" articles published in Morskoy Sbornik, the Soviet Navy must feel this is an effective approach to disseminating information.

From an editorial which was published in the magazine in February, 1971, entitled "About the Journal Morskoy Sbornik," a great deal of insight can be gained concerning the effectiveness of the journal. It was noted that the activities



of the magazine were thoroughly analyzed and ways to improve its contents were pointed out by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov and Admiral V. M. Grishanov, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Navy and member of the Military Council.

The Military Council of the Navy recommended to the Fleet Councils that they periodically review the question of using materials from the journal to solve problems in combat and political training, in increasing combat readiness, and in the political education of naval personnel.

The Military Council also recommended that commanders continually show concern for the dissemination and distribution of the magazine and that they explain to officers that the journal is a vital means for imparting their political, military, and specialized knowledge, and for broadening their operational-tactical views.

In June, 1980, Morskoy Sbornik was awarded the Order of the Red Star by L. Brezhnev, Chairmen of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The citation read:

For services rendered in communist and military indoctrination of Soviet navymen and mobilizing them for successful performance of their missions in defense of our socialist Homeland, the journal Morskoy Sbornik is awarded the Order of the Red Star [Ref. 32].

Great efforts are being made to make Morskoy Sbornik an effective organ of the Soviet Navy and CPSU. Admiral Gorshkov has personally taken an interest in its performance. The



fact that the journal has been awarded the Order of the Red Star is proof that these efforts are paying off.





#### IV. COMPARISON AND CONTRAST WITH U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

The comparison of Morskoy Sbornik to the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings will enable the reader to gain some insight into professional naval journals. Sometimes there is a tendency to isolate a subject that is being examined to get at all the details. This is only normal and, in many cases, very necessary. However, in order to gain the proper perspective in this examination of Morskoy Sbornik, it is necessary to compare and contrast it with another journal. And what better journal to use for the purpose than U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings?

##### A. SIMILARITIES

Both journals were found in the 1800's by groups of distinguished and respected naval officers. Morskoy Sbornik was founded by a group of leading Russian naval officers, led by Vice Admiral F. Litke. Vice Admiral Litke was a well known scientist and navigator of his day. The objective of the journal was the dissemination of useful information to the fleet.

An article in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in October, 1973 (100th anniversary issue) by Captain Roy C. Smith, USN, describes the founding of the Proceedings. Captain Smith



states that on 9 October 1873, there was a meeting of 15 officers at the U. S. Naval Academy. Superintendent, Rear Admiral John L. Warden presided. There is no record of whose idea it was to hold the meeting. However, best indications are that the idea came from Commodore Foxhall Parker. The new organization's objective was "the advancement of professional and scientific knowledge in the Navy."

Each journal's readership extends to those who have an interest in naval and maritime affairs (not only officers) and each has a foreign readership. The Soviet Morskoy Sbornik has been available to Western subscribers since 1963 and has a readership in over 70 countries.

The U.S. Naval Institute has a membership of 65,000. Over 20,000 are regular members and the remainder are associate members. Regular members are regular officers of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. Associate members are others who are interested in the naval and maritime services. Today the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings has a readership in 80 countries.

Both professional journals publish articles by junior as well as senior naval officers although articles by junior officers are much less frequent in Morskoy Sbornik than in Proceedings. Articles by civilian specialists are also found in both publications. The June, 1982, issue of Morskoy Sbornik had no articles authorized by junior officers. The same issue had three articles written by civilian specialists



and three articles by flag level officers. Morskoy Sbornik, unlike Proceedings, publishes many articles by flag level officers.

The June, 1982, issue of Proceedings published six articles by junior officers and five by civilian specialists. This issue of Proceedings also carried an article by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, entitled "Thank God for Sitting Ducks." Articles by flag level officers, especially the Chief of Naval Operations are infrequent in Proceedings.

The substantial articles published in both journals are usually very well researched and written. They are timely pieces which are thought-provoking and truly committed to the advancement of professional and scientific knowledge in the maritime and naval fields. The July, 1982, issue of Morskoy Sbornik published an article entitled "Aviation Against Ships (Comments on the Anglo-Argentine Conflict)." The article began by calling it a conflict between an "imperialist predator" who would prefer to see the world in its past colonial aspect and a "nonaligned country."

A brief history of the Malvinas<sup>2</sup> (called the Falkland Islands in England) is discussed, beginning with its discovery

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<sup>2</sup>It is noteworthy that the Soviets refer to the islands as the Malvinas, the name that Argentina uses.



in 1520. It states that the British "seized" the islands in 1833 and that Argentina announces its protest each year since the event. The article also notes that the British refuse to undertake peaceful negotiations on the matter.

Also included is the composition of the forces of the two sides and an account of the combat operations. This piece was timely in that the Argentine Falkland garrison surrendered on 15 June 1982 and the article was published 7 July 1982.

According to an editorial in Morskoy Sbornik (February, 1971), the magazine should expose the aggressive nature of Western navies and their role in "predatory wars;" therefore, most writings about foreign wars in the Soviet journal inject a class struggle aspect into it. These articles also analyze the combat operations conducted in an attempt to learn from others.

Proceedings in their September, 1982, issue published three articles concerning the British-Argentine conflict over the Falklands. Two of the articles, "Maneuver Warfare at Sea" and "Maneuvering in the Falklands," both by Commander Robert J. Kelsey, USN, discussed the maneuver-oriented strategy that Great Britain used and its place in the U.S. Navy. Both articles were well written, informative and timely.





The third article, entitled "The Falklands Conflict" by Sir James Cable<sup>3</sup>, examines the reasons the British fought for the Falkland Islands. This is a very informative piece which discusses future NATO and international implications of British actions.

All three of the articles were thought-provoking pieces which gave the reader insight into several aspects of the British-Argentine conflict in a timely manner. These articles are indicative of the quality and timeliness of materials published in both journals.

#### B. DIFFERENCES

More important and noteworthy than the similarities between Morskoy Sbornik and the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings are the differences. First, the U.S. Naval Institute is a private organization for those interested in naval and maritime affairs. It is not a part of the U.S. Navy Department and is a self-supporting, non-profit organization. Every edition of Proceedings has the following statement printed just below the table of contents:

The opinions or assertions in the articles are the personal ones of the authors and are not to be construed as official. They do not necessarily reflect the views of either the Navy Department or the U.S. Naval Institute.

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<sup>3</sup>Sir James Cable is a retired British Ambassador, who now spends his time writing on international relations and Naval affairs.



Morskoy Sbornik is an official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet Navy. The Naval General Staff was given control of Morskoy Sbornik on 29 November 1917; thus, the Communist Party put the magazine at the services of the Soviet Fleet.

According to Vice Admiral Shchedrin, Morskoy Sbornik is provided with a great deal of assistance by the General Staff and the Central Political Administration of the Soviet Navy. The magazine's activities are directed by the Navy Military Council. The council receives reports by the editor-in-chief, assigns specific tasks and indicates ways in which they can be accomplished. The editorial staff is required to rigidly follow the policy of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in all matters, especially with respect to developing the fleet and raising combat readiness; to propagate Marxist-Leninist theory and the decisions of CPSU Congresses and Plenums of the Party's Central Committee; and to instill in officers good moral-political qualities.

Morskoy Sbornik publishes many articles which are based on materials from the foreign press; this is not seen very often in the U.S. publications. This is most likely due to our different views with regard to freedom of information and freedom of the press. Because information is more available in the West, it affords greater opportunity for the



Soviet than for the U.S. writer to use foreign press material in his research. Most of the articles published in Morskoy Sbornik are noted with a subtitle stating that they are based on material from the foreign press. It is assumed that the entire article is based on foreign press materials, even though the publications are rarely cited. Some articles which are obviously based on the foreign press are not labeled as such.

Morskoy Sbornik published an article in March, 1982, entitled "NATO's Plans for Maritime Transport," by Captain 1st Rank Yu. Bol'shakov, Ya. Borisov, and V. Vektorov. The following is an excerpt from this article which was based on foreign press material:

In the situation of ever-growing anti-Soviet hysteria and aggressiveness on the part of the United States and some of its NATO allies the Western press has begun giving greater attention to the problems of preparing the transport fleet for war and defense of sea lanes. A survey of some material on this subject is offered to the reader in the article below [Ref. 33].

An earlier article (December, 1981) published in the Soviet journal, entitled "Anti Detente Policy," by Captain 2nd Rank N. Kabalin, was also based on foreign press materials. The author indicated in the article that material was based on the foreign press as in this example:

Judging by reports in the foreign press, during the operational training of the NATO navies, attention was focused on work on the following missions: switching naval forces from a peacetime to a wartime footing in case of a worsening of the international



situation; reinforcing the forward groupings of armed forces on the NATO flanks; the formation and use of multi-national units of naval forces for operations under exceptional circumstances; cooperation with other branches of the national armed forces and the bloc as a whole . . . . [Ref. 34].

Directly related to the extensive use of foreign press materials by the Soviets is the relatively large number of articles describing foreign (especially U.S.) weapon systems. It is amazing how much information can be collected on U.S. weapon systems from open sources. For example, in Morskoy Sbornik, No. 8, 1980, an article entitled "The U.S. Navy's Hornet" contains detailed information on design features, power plant, armament and on-board electronic equipment of the aircraft.

The following basic design data was published:

Basic design data: Weight of empty aircraft--9,340 kg; take-off weight--15,260 - 22,700 kg (depending on variant of use); maximum speed at high altitude--1,900 km/hr; combat radius with four missiles and fuel reserve in internal tanks--740 km; combat ceiling--15,00 m; wing span--11.4 m (7.6 with folded panels); wing area--38.5 m<sup>2</sup>; length--17 m; height--4.5 m. The aircraft is developed by McDonnell Douglas (prime contractor) and Northrop (subcontractor). Plans for its production have not yet been determined once and for all. It was initially planned to make 800 series produced aircraft and 11 test models . . . . [Ref. 35].

Another such article was published in June, 1982, by Morskoy Sbornik. "The Shipboard Radars of the British Navy" by Captain 3rd Rank B. Azarov provides detailed data on many British radar systems. The author does note that his article is based on material from the foreign press. The





following excerpt is used to describe the SAPPHIRE fire control system employed by the British:

Jamproofing of the radar involves the use of a mono-pulse method of direction-finding and of digital selection of moving targets, and the resetting of working frequency from impulse to impulse (automatic and manual regimes); tracking in passive regime the target source of jamming; changing pulse repetition frequency and duration; and combining a V0051-system television camera with the antenna device. Utilization of the super-high-frequency range, pulses of short duration and the monopause method of direction-finding makes it possible to achieve fairly high accuracy in tracking an aerial target; 1.0 - 1.7 minutes for angular coordinates and 1 - 3 meters for range. Blind area tracking regime is 350 meters [Ref. 36].

The Soviets can get this type of detailed information because of Western views in regard to freedom of the press and freedom of information. A Soviet researcher can collect detailed technical data from Western open source publications. Sometimes material published in the open source publications is classified. Therefore, it is very easy for the Soviets to collect large amounts of important information from the West.

It is very rare for the Soviets to discuss their own weapon systems because of their tight security. And it is also unusual for Proceedings to publish a detailed article on Soviet weapon system. This is because U.S. authors cannot gather that type of information from open sources in the Soviet Union.

However, other articles of a non-technical and unclassified nature are sometimes found in the pages of Proceedings.



A good example of this is the October, 1982, Soviet Navy issue of Proceedings. The entire issue is dedicated to discussion and examination of many facets of the Soviet Navy. Many articles in this issue use materials drawn from Soviet open sources.

One example is an article entitled "Their Missions and Tactics" by Norman Polmar with Norman Friedman. This article discusses what the authors refer to as "profound differences between Soviet and Western naval 'style.'"

The authors draw material from several works of Admiral Gorshkov to show why the Soviet Navy has rejected the theories of Mahan which form the basis of U.S. Naval thought.

From Gorshkov's "Red Star Rising at Sea," the authors draw on his conclusions of German U-boat operations during World War II. Polmar and Friedman also quote from this writing to give reasons for the Soviet rejection of Mahan theories.

Later, an excerpt is used from Gorshkov's "The Sea Power of the State" to provide a Soviet view of forward operations in peacetime. The authors also use an article written by Admiral Gorshkov entitled "Naval Cruises Play Role in Training, International Relations" (Bloknot Agitatora, No. 8, April, 1973) to give the Soviet view of using sailors as ambassadors to other countries.

An article entitled "Concerning Some Trends in the Development of Naval Tactics" by Captain 1st Rank N. Vo'yunenko



(Morskoy Sbornik, October 1975) is used to describe Soviet interest in helicopter ASW operations. The authors use a quote from the article to help make their point.

A piece entitled "Their SSGs/SSGNs" by Milan Vego (Proceedings, October, 1982) is another example of using foreign press sources. In this article Vego examines the SSG/SSGN threat to the U.S. Navy and, in doing so, draws from several Soviet open sources.

To list target priorities for SSG's/SSGN's, Vego draws from "Naval Intelligence Targets and Forces" by Captain 1st Rank K. Titov. This article was published by Morskoy Sbornik in September, 1972. These target priorities are listed by combat operational targets and targets for anti-SLOC missions.

Captain 1st Rank B. Kostev's "Coordination--the Most Important Principle in the Employment of Forces" (Morskoy Sbornik, February, 1974) was used to describe close cooperation between attacking units. Kostev stated that cooperation had two objectives: first, to prevent mutual interference, and second, to achieve an effective strike.

In stressing the importance the Soviets place on coordinating the use of weapons, the author uses a quote from Gorshkov's "Navies in War and in Peace," Morskoy Sbornik, February 1973.

Admittedly, entire issues of Proceedings devoted to the Soviet Union are rare. However, individual articles on



specific topics of the Soviet Navy based on Soviet open sources are published occasionally in the journal.

Another interesting difference to note is the role of ideology. Ideology plays a very important role in Soviet society; therefore, it is not surprising that Marxist-Leninist ideology is also vital in the publication of Morskoy Sbornik.

Marxist-Leninist ideology is a comprehensive, consistent, and coherent basis for which Soviet authors draw their views. The Communist Party establishes the "correct" point of view on any subject and it is required that it be complied with and disseminated. All Soviet military writings must be ideologically correct.

Morskoy Sbornik published an article in July, 1982, entitled "Methodological Problems of the Theory of Building a Navy and Employing it in Battle" by Rear Admiral V. Gulin and Captain 1st Rank Yu. Borisov. This piece emphasizes the importance of establishing the proper view when examining any subject. The authors state that an expert in any field must approach a particular problem from the standpoint of his general ideas about the world and social processes.

Gulin and Borisov go on to say:

As for military affairs and a constituent part of it such as building the navy and employing it in battle, in our day these matters are closely tied to all aspects of social life and determined by them. Therefore, a comprehensive study of them must be done from the





standpoint of the different fields of knowledge, above all from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism as a scientific world view and methodology [Ref. 37].

Gulin and Borison are saying that a Marxist-Leninist philosophy is a universal methodology. This Marxist-Leninist philosophy provides the framework for methodological principles related to acquiring knowledge about all aspects of activity, including military affairs. It is therefore important that all military theory and problems be worked out within the framework of a Marxist-Leninist methodology.

How does this relate to naval theory? According to Soviet writings, each branch of the armed forces is capable of bringing force to bear on land, sea and air. Because victory is achieved by coordinated efforts, it is necessary to integrate all knowledge about warfare within the limits of a unified military science.

Since each branch of the armed forces has specific inherent features, it must be studied differently by each of the corresponding branches. However, it must be stressed that they fall within the framework of military science. Above all, providing the basis for all theoretical research is the Marxist-Leninist philosophy. That is all social life, including war must be evaluated from the social class aspect. War is an extension of politics and the significance of Western and Soviet policy must not be overlooked.

To ensure that the correct point of view is present, each publication must be approved by the Main Political



Administration. This was pointed out by the editors of the magazine in an article entitled "About the Journal Morskoy Sbornik" (February, 1971, p. 34).

The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union are required to carry out a great deal of ideological training.

The Military Council of the Navy has obliged Morskoy Sbornik to elucidate in depth for Naval personnel the concepts of Marxism-Leninism and the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government [Ref. 12].

Rear Admiral V. Gulin and Captain 2nd Rank I. Povalyayev wrote "Two Approaches to One Subject," which was published by Morskoy Sbornik in November, 1979. The authors emphasize the intensification of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism.

Gulin and Povalyayev state that the ideological struggle is becoming the most urgent under the conditions of peaceful coexistence. This is a time of bitterness and exacerbation of that struggle, in which the historical offensive belongs to socialism. Imperialism is mounting ideological counter-attacks in an attempt to recover its losses.

The Soviets seem to think that the struggle for ideas is most important and they cannot ease their efforts in combating the capitalists in this struggle.

Another peculiar divergence of Morskoy Sbornik from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings is the importance which is placed on historical analysis. Each edition has an entire



section with several articles entitled "The Pages of History." Examination of historical events is also published in the "Naval Art" section of the magazine. These articles usually provide an analysis of a past campaign, battle or operation; usually cited are examples from World War II.

This focus on historical analysis has deep ideological roots. Not only must the articles have the proper ideological basis but the methodology the magazine uses to accomplish its tasks must be ideologically "correct."

The founders of Marxism thoroughly revealed the importance of a historical approach to an analysis of modern social phenomena and prospects for their development [Ref. 38].

It is believed that the study of past combat actions can be of tremendous benefit to the Soviet Navy. For example, the following statement was made with regard to amphibious operations:

The experience of amphibious actions gained by the Navy in the war years is of enormous importance for the development of naval art under present-day conditions [Ref. 14].

"The Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War" by Admiral V. Sysoyev was published in Morskoy Sbornik in March, 1979. This is a good example of studying past combat actions to develop naval strategy. The article discusses joint operations, defense of naval bases, amphibious landings and protection of sea communications.



Sysoyev notes that:

The wealth of combat experience acquired in the Great Patriotic War and the rapid postwar development of the material means of waging warfare at sea have become the foundation of further development of naval strategy [Ref. 39].

There is another type of historical article found in Morskoy Sbornik. These articles are accounts of brave and heroic deeds of the Soviet fighting man in battle.

It is imperative to broadly propagandize the revolutionary and battle traditions of the Communist Party and Soviet people, the heroism displayed by navy men during the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, and the glorious history of our country's navy [Ref. 40].

An example of this type of article was written by Captain 1st Rank A. Mel'chin, entitled "Following a Heading of Courage," and appeared in the January, 1980, issue of Morskoy Sbornik. This is a chronicle of the men of the Pacific fleet. Mel'chin refers to them as legendary and states that the Soviet people should take pride in them. Its predecessors, the Okhatsk and subsequently the Siberian flotillas, added several vivid pages to the history of the Soviet Union.

A second example is an article which appeared in the May, 1980, issue of the journal. The article, entitled "They Served in Battle for the Homeland," was written by the editorial staff. It is an account of the 1st Guarts Division of small subclasses of the Baltic fleet. This unit was involved in combat operations from the very first days of World War II.





"The People Are Proud of You. . ." by Rear Admiral V. Ruthovskiy appeared in the same May, 1980, issue. In this piece Ruthkovskiy reminisces about the legendary Soviet military leader seaman, Mikhaylovich Budenny. Despite the passage of nearly 40 years since the end of World War II, he is still revered by the fighting men of the Soviet armed forces.

These articles are intended to instill in navy men a devotion to the Communist Party and Soviet people and a commitment to fight for the Socialist cause.

Another difference between the two journals is that one sees less open disagreements about naval theory of military procedures in Morskoy Sbornik. This is because the magazine is an official press organ of the Soviet Navy and, as such, publishes only articles which are in line with official policy decisions. However, when a policy has not yet been decided upon by the Central Committee of the CPSU, Morskoy Sbornik is used as a forum for discussion and debate.

The establishment and development of any science or theory entails, as a rule, sharp debate and the overcoming of difficulties, both objective and subjective. This is quite normal, and it applies in full measure to the system of knowledge about the Navy, since the latter's development and refinement is a continuing process, one which, moreover, is sometimes controversial, for a number of political, economic and other reasons [Ref. 41].

These discussions are used to work out problems and to bring about a united view on a subject in order that a policy or doctrine be established.



Sharp disagreements are rare, but not unknown, in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik. Discussed earlier in this piece is an intense ongoing debate of an article written by Vice Admiral K. Stalbo entitled "Some Issues of the Theory of the Development and Employment of the Navy." Stalbo wrote the article because he thinks there is an urgent need for a systematic examination of the primary elements of the theory. His article touched off critical responses from other senior Soviet naval officers.

Vice Admiral Stalbo's article has been attacked by many well known senior Soviet naval officers who have found several shortcomings in it. The three basic areas in which Stalbo is criticized are ideological, theoretical and operational.

Admiral V. N. Chernavin stated in his article (Morskoy Sbornik, January, 1982), which criticized Stalbo's theory, that this debate should continue. He further states that its continuation will serve to find solutions to theoretical problems of Naval theory.

According to Dr. Sugg's article, "The Soviet Navy: Changing of the Guard?" (Proceedings, April, 1983), this debate may indicate that Admiral Gorshkov is in some political trouble. Suggs points out that Stalbo has always been very closely associated with Gorshkov and appears to be speaking for him in this case.



Suggs remarks that the debate has all the signs of careful planning , coordination and approval. Because of Stalbo's connection with Gorskhov and the intensity of the criticism, Suggs believes that the attack (presumably on Gorshkov) was originated outside the Soviet Navy at a high level within the Party.

Suggs concludes that the debate provides a forum for discussion of important issues and it exerts pressure on Gorshkov. It may be related to widespread changes in the Soviet military and political hierarchy initiated during Brezhnev's final months, possibly by the Andropov faction.

Another peculiarity, which is sometimes shocking to the unattuned, is Morskoy Sbornik's aggressive attacks on the opinions and principles of the Western nations. The use of polemics and strong language is not something new in Soviet writings.

We devote a great deal of time to cultivation of hatred in navy personnel against enemies of socialism and communism, i.e., against, the imperialist aggressors [Ref. 42].

In a recent article, it was stated that:

Morskoy Sbornik . . . lays bare the reactionary essence of bourgeois ideology, and teaches a class hatred toward the enemy of peace--the imperialist [Ref. 43].

For example, "imperialists" are said to be inculcated with "rabid anticommunism" and "bestial hatred" for socialism. And the "adventuristic bourgeois navies'" indoctrination is based on "antihumanism."



Vice Admiral A. Gontayet wrote:

The military doctrines of capitalistic states, where private ownership relationships dominate and a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is exercised, reflect an attempt to perpetuate the dominance of exploiting classes within their own countries, to eliminate or weaken the world system of socialism, and to enslave other states economically and politically [Ref. 44].

These are only a few examples of polemics which occur in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik.

Another distinction between Morskoy Sbornik and the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings is that it is not uncommon for the Soviets to publicly reprimand or embarrass individuals who have failed in their duties. This practice is common in both military and civil publications in the Soviet Union. The following is an example:

. . . Last year, for example, there was a decline in the state of military discipline in the subunit where Captain 3rd Rank B. Zabelin is the secretary of the party organization. Among the violators were even some communists [Ref. 45].

The Soviets also use their journal to publicly recognize good work:

. . . Nikolayev, for example, besides conducting discussions and delivering lectures, headed the council on military-technical propaganda. The personnel love to meet with him and listen to his speeches [Ref. 46].

Morskoy Sbornik and Proceedings are both fine professional naval journals. Each has a large international readership which is interested in naval and maritime subjects. Both journals contain writings by junior as well as senior officers and civilian specialists; it is noteworthy that many articles in Morskoy Sbornik are written by flag level naval officers.





The differences between the two magazines are a result of Morskoy Sbornik being an official organ of the state and Proceedings being a private organization. Because of this Morskoy Sbornik must publish articles which are ideologically correct and best serve the needs of the Soviet Navy and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. To ensure that the articles are ideologically correct, they must be approved (censored) by the Main Political Administration.

Because Morskoy Sbornik is an official publication, it serves the Soviet Navy and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. All of the theoretical discussions fall within the framework of Marxist-Leninist methodology. That is, a social class point of view is taken. Provided the various peculiarities are kept in mind, the Soviet journal is quite informative and thought-provoking.



## V. VARIOUS SOVIET PERCEPTIONS

Morskoy Sbornik contains a great deal of useful information concerning Soviet views on various subjects. As discussed earlier, the journal has three primary missions: to foster a unity of views, to serve as a forum for discussion and debate, and to disseminate useful information.

By keeping these missions in mind, nothing the authorship, the number of articles on a topic, the intensity of its tone, and the phrases used, it is possible to glean Soviet thought on a particular subject. This must also be combined with a basic knowledge of history, political culture and ideology.

In this section, three topics of interest will be examined in an attempt to uncover Soviet perceptions on these subjects. The three subjects are: the maritime threat, command and control, and the commanding officer.

### A. MARITIME THREAT

Morskoy Sbornik publishes many articles which refer to the military threat posed to the Soviet Union by the United States and its allies. These articles fall into two categories. The first type is primarily critical of the aggressive intentions of the West, led by the United States. They portray the United States and its allies, especially the NATO allies, as being very aggressive and preparing for war against the Soviet Union. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet



Union S. Gorshkov wrote in January, 1981, that:

The growth and combat-readiness of our navy are a warning to those militaristic circles of imperialism which continue to oppose the lessening of tension in the world, intensify the arms race, make preparations for war, and create more and more dangerous flash-points in various parts of the world [Ref. 47].

Another article appearing in April, 1982, written by Rear Admiral B. Yashin, states:

Thus, the realization of plans for strengthening the overall might of the U.S. Navy and the adoption of the "Reagan Navy" program represent a new, dangerous and unwarranted stage of the naval weapons race that has been unleashed by the United States on an unprecedented scale [Ref. 48].

The magazine also attacks the "myth" of the Soviet threat to the West. Rear Admiral B. Yashin writes:

Even a cursory examination of the American press confirms that the departments of the Army and Navy are trying to broaden the completely unjustified military preparations to the accompaniment of ill-intentioned fabrications about the "Soviet Threat." It has come down to where they are trying to justify preparations for an allegedly "regulatable limited nuclear war which can be controlled," and are amusing themselves with the hope of "disarming" the USSR with the very first strike [Ref. 49].

Morskoy Sbornik publishes many such articles by senior naval officers which are completely devoted to attacking Western aggressive intentions and actions. The articles all use the same or similar phrases and, in many cases, use polemics. The emotional intensity of these articles seems to be high and they have been especially intense since President Reagan assumed office. In February, 1982, Morskoy Sbornik published an editorial which stated:



But lately the intensity of the world situation is becoming more and more dangerous. The threat of nuclear war hovers over the entire planet today.

Direct responsibility for the situation at hand is borne above all by the United States of America. With the arrival of President Reagan to power, . . . with their very first statements and practical steps the heads of the new U.S. -overnment seemingly set the goal not of correcting, but multiplying the mistakes of the previous administration and contributing not to a relaxation of international tension, but to its intensification [Ref. 50].

These kinds of articles are considered a very important part in the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism. The West, led by the United States, is trying to distort the essence and social purpose of the military power of the Soviet Union. This requires great effort by the Soviets to criticize imperialist military doctrine.

Aside from being obliged by ideology, these articles reflect a concern by the Soviets of the recent large military spending and preparations taking place in the West. Since President Reagan's arrival in office, not only has there been a greater emphasis on the armed forces in the United States and its allies, but the U.S. government has taken a "hard line" foreign policy stand with the Soviet Union. This does seem to be of concern to the Soviets.

From the same February, 1982, editorial referred to earlier the Soviets state that, with the arrival of President Reagan to power, the United States foreign policy has been characterized as "hard line." The piece quotes Weinberger





as saying that President Reagan's administration is striving "to revive America's past might and rearm it so that the United States can hold talks from a position of strength."

The second type of article primarily addresses naval capabilities of the United States and its allies. This type of article usually presents analyses or descriptions of ships, aircraft, weapons, sensors, support facilities and tactics. Some get straight to the point, but most have to get in at least one aggressive criticism toward the West.

From these articles, it is possible to gain valuable insight as to which weapon system(s) the Soviets perceive as the greatest threat to their security. Detailed discussions of certain topics keep reappearing in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik; one must conclude that these are of great interest to the Soviets. The topics stressed over the past few years are: the Trident system, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and anti-submarine warfare forces.

An article written by Captains 1st Rank G. Luk'yanov and M. Sdov'yev in March, 1981, entitled "The Atlantic and NATO," discusses all three of the topics cited above. All three are discussed in the context of the United States and NATO's dangerous policy of building up the arms race.

First it was noted that a decision to deploy 464 cruise missiles (Tomahawk) and an additional 108 Pershing-2 missiles would be implemented. This would be the beginning of a new concept in Western European defense.



Mentioned next was the Trident program. The Soviets call it an important new program that will increase the combat potential of nuclear powered missile-carrying submarines. It is noted that thirteen submarines have been authorized and eight are now being built. There will be a follow-on Trident II missile in production later.

The SOSUS submarine detection system is also discussed. The system is employed in strategic areas where it is likely to detect Soviet submarines. SOSUS is constantly being improved and subsystems are being developed to complement it.

A second article by Major Boytsov in April, 1981, states that the Pentagon is placing reliance on creating a potential for a "disarming first strike" by increasing accuracy and yield of nuclear weapons.

Major Boytsov accused the United States of increasing the nuclear arms race by already planning to refit the Ohio class SSBN with the more accurate Trident-2 ballistic missile after stepping up the rate of construction. Boytsov also notes that the U.S. will have up to 250 B-1 strategic bombers and 150 B-52 strategic bombers with 3,000 cruise missiles (Tomahawk) by the early 1990's.

One of the most unusual series of articles to appear in Morskoy Sbornik is entitled "The U.S. Navy by the Year 2000." This two-part series appeared in the June and July issues of 1981. This series deserves special attention because it is



the first article in the magazine attempting to predict the state of development of the U.S. Navy in the long term. One possible reason for the series is the growing emphasis by the Soviets on forecasting in decision-making and for increased lead time for program planning.

The authors (editorial staff) wrote that the United States stressed preemptive strikes and counterforce capability as a fundamental principle. They identify three major areas of "U.S. deterrence," the Trident system first, Tomahawk cruise missile second, and the antisubmarine warfare forces third.

To assure a "strategy of deterrence" (or restraint") stress is placed on carrying out the Trident program as soon as possible and fully; on providing a so-called "counter-force" struggle, and on raising the accuracy of missile-warhead guidance. The Americans consider the Tomahawk cruise missile the second and no less important component of "deterrence." It is planned to equip no less than 60 submarines and approximately 100 surface ships of various classes with them.

The men and resources of "ASW" are considered the third element of "restraint" in the USA. Ever increasing importance is attached to its development [Ref. 51].

It is easy to see the high interest the Soviets show in Trident, Tomahawk and antisubmarine warfare forces.

"The Reaganavy" or "The Three-Ocean Navy," written by Rear Admiral B. Yashin (Reserves), appeared in April, 1982. It also paid particular to Trident, Tomahawk and antisubmarine warfare forces. There was much space allocated to discuss these subjects. In reference to the Trident system, Rear Admiral Yashin stated:





Further strengthening of the naval component of the strategic forces will be accomplished by increasing the rate of construction of new SSBN's of the Ohio class with Trident I and II missiles and completing the retrofitting of 12 Poseidon SSBN's to the Trident I missile [Ref. 52].

Of antisubmarine warfare forces, Yashin writes:

Note must be made of the intensification of attention to the construction of specialized ships for long-range sonar surveillance, which are intended to strengthen task forces of ASW ships and extend the sphere of effectiveness of the SOSUS system [Ref. 53].

Later in the article, when the discussion turns back to offensive capabilities, the author notes:

To increase its "offensive potential," the Navy proposes to equip up to 150 combatants, vessels and submarines with Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles. Some SSBN's of the GEORGE WASHINGTON class are being converted to cruise missile carriers. It is planned to put all four battleships of the IOWA class into service and install missile launchers on each of them for 32 Tomahawk and 16 Harpoon missiles. In all, it is planned to buy about 4,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles and bring the total number of launchers for these missiles up to 2,600 during the 1980's [Ref. 54].

The final example, an article written by Major M. Boytsov in October, 1982, discusses "NATO Nuclear Weapons in the Theater of War." In this article, the author illustrates the significant increase in United States nuclear potential in the European theater of military operations. Included in his list of long-range nuclear weapons is the "Trident-1 ballistic missiles of nuclear-powered submarines."

Boytsov goes on to say that the arsenal of naval nuclear weapons is most diverse. He lists the ASROC (ASW guided missiles of surface ships) and SUBROC (ASW guided missiles





of submarines) as part of the inventory. Later he notes that the sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles will significantly improve the NATO strategic nuclear weapon capability in the foreseeable future.

The threat articles reviewed in Morskoy Sbornik thus reflect the Soviet view that the United States Trident system, Tomahawk cruise missile and antisubmarine warfare forces are a threat to the security of the Soviet Union. The articles used as examples were selected because they are representative of the many articles which discuss these topics. There are many articles which focus on one topic alone. Some of these articles are: "TRIDENT Is Being Improved" by Ye Rankin Which emphasizes technological improvements of SLBM's and warns that they are approaching absolute accuracy; "ATTENTION: TOMAHAWK!" by Captain 1st Rank B. Rodionov and Senior Lieutenant-Engineer N. Novichkov describes in detail the technical features and possible employment tactics; and "Reconnaissance of Nuclear Ballistic-Missile Submarines" by I. Kuz'mum. This article notes that the system the United States is establishing to combat nuclear ballistic-missile submarines has great potential.

The most vaunted characteristic of Trident and Tomahawk (especially submarine-launched Tomahawk) is its invulnerability. In terms of Western deterrence theory, this provides an "assured response." However, the implication of



invulnerability from the Soviet point of view is that these missiles can be held back from the initial exchange and can be used at a later stage of the war.

The capacity of sea-based nuclear delivery systems to survive the initial exchange affects an important aspect of Soviet military thinking. The requirement for strategic reserves is essential to the concept of war-fighting with nuclear weapons. Soviet strategy must assume that the availability of nuclear weapons be critical at certain (later) stages in a war. It must also be assumed that sole possession of a substantial nuclear capability will likely determine the outcome of the war and the political structure of the post-war world. Since the United States is significantly improving its sea-based systems with Trident and Tomahawk, the Soviet Union is concerned.

Basically the same logic can be applied to the concern with U.S. antisubmarine warfare forces. The fact that the U.S. is emphasizing the improvement of ASW forces is a direct threat to the Soviet strategic reserve, Soviet SSBN's.

Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union would be concerned with recent developments in Trident, Tomahawk and antisubmarine warfare forces.

## B. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE SOVIET NAVY

Command and Control is nothing new in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik; however, in recent years, it has been



emphasized in the magazine. The reason for this, as stated in the articles, is the changing conditions and nature of modern warfare. The Soviets perceive that modern warfare will be complicated by its diverse situational variations, large spatial scope and accelerated tempo. They are also discussing the advantages and disadvantages of centralized and decentralized control of forces. They feel that both have a place in their system of control. The role and potential of automated control systems are examined; the Soviets think that automated control systems are necessary to aid the commanding officer in decision-making under the conditions of modern warfare.

The recent increase in the number of articles concerning command and control (including automated control systems) began in May, 1980, with a two-part series written by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov, entitled "Problems with Respect to Control of Naval Forces." Admiral Gorshkov points out that modern day combat operations will be characterized by the large spatial scope, accelerated tempo, and diverse variation in the situation during combat at sea. Commanding officers at all levels will have very little time to make important decisions.

Because of large tactical fleets, Gorshkov states that the most important and difficult responsibilities of the fleet Commander-in-Chief becomes the organization, training



and conducting of combat operations of the forces under his command. This, along with the evolution of forces and the increased number of missions carried out, makes control very complicated.

In December, 1969, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Brezhnev said:

Under present conditions, it is getting beyond the capacity of an experienced and even talented organizer to lead in the old fashioned way, by relying only on previous experience and common sense. Control is being transformed into a science, and this science must be mastered as quickly and as thoroughly as possible, and must be studied persistently even by the one who assumes high-level command and control responsibilities.

Next, the article discussed centralized and decentralized control. It states that there must be a correlation between centralized and decentralized control of forces in naval operations. Centralized control methods have noteworthy advantages. First, they make it possible to achieve efficient coordination and support of all the forces employed in the operation. Second, they have the ability to redirect individual units in the presence of a rapidly shifting situation.

Gorshkov also goes on to say that under certain conditions, superfluous centralization of control can result in an intolerable overload on the staff and lowering of the effectiveness of control. Also, to a certain degree, it can paralyze the independence and initiative of subordinates. Therefore, the level of centralization will depend on the situation that has





developed, and control systems must provide both centralized and decentralized control of forces.

Later the Admiral makes the point that, because of the complex nature of the control problem, it requires a complex systems approach to develop a system for control of forces. Quality in control today can only be accomplished by the use of automated control systems. Automated control systems which use special control software will not only increase efficiency but will create the possibility of reinforcing the intellect of the commanding officers at all levels under everyday and combat situations. Thus in critical conditions, it will be possible to optimize efforts and increase combat effectiveness. Automated control equipment is elevated to a level which is as important as weaponry.

Basically this article is stating that under modern conditions the importance of the control system has sharply increased and that the primary purpose of an automated control system is to assist the commanding officer in making the most expedient decision.

The second part of Gorshkov's article, published in June, 1980, discusses the dialectics of control categories in relation to the incorporation of computer technology and software into the control process.

For the purposes of our discussion, the main point to be gained from part two of the series is the human element role.



Admiral Gorshkov emphasizes that control technology and software are only a means to facilitate the most correct decision and to develop an operations plan to implement it. Mathematical models do not give the commanding officer or his staff a decision or operations plan but only quantitative data to work out a decision or plan. Thus the decision will always be subjective for the final decision is the commanding officer's, not matter what level of development the automated control equipment has reached.

Rear Admiral M. Iskanderov wrote a piece called "The Development of Battle," published in May, 1980. Iskanderov basically says that because of the great increase in quantitative characteristics of battle, that is, the number of ships and other forces employed and the scope of time and area, control becomes increasingly difficult. Like Gorshkov, he notes that the increase of "spatial scope" causes complications and that the time factor has acquired new significance.

The major conclusion of the article, based on the experience of past wars, is that under otherwise equal conditions the side with the best control will win the battle.

Taking the lead from Admiral Gorshkov, an article written by Captain 1st Rank Ye. Dvoryanov was published in January, 1981. Dvoryanov's "Some Tendencies in the Development of Control of Naval Troops and Forces in Amphibious Landing Operations" begins by commenting that Admiral Gorshkov's two-part series (May and June, 1981) presented in full



detail the role and principal lines of development of a modern system of naval control.

The article is an examination of the development of the control of naval and ground troops in amphibious operation during World War II. Two factors which were mentioned by Admiral Gorshkov were also noted as having their effect on the development of control of naval troops and forces; these factors were accelerated time periods in which to conduct operations and sharply changing situations.

Similar points are made in an article by Admiral V. Sidorov, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, entitled "The Staff of a Fleet as an Organ of Control." The article, published in October, 1981, starts out by pointing out that the nature and conditions of modern combat are very complex and control organs are very important.

Sidorov notes, as did Gorshkov, that automation of control is a very effective means to improve the system. Studies have shown that only ten percent of available information is used to work out a combat order without the aid of an automated control system. This will naturally reflect upon the effectiveness of the assigned mission.

A second important point made is that the final decision is made by the commander and not the "machine." The automated control equipment is a tool to be used by the commander in making his decision and, when necessary, he must adjust a decision developed by the system.



In March of 1982, an article entitled "The Theory of Control of the Navy" by Admiral V. Sysoyev was published in Morskoy Sbornik. Admiral Sysayev makes a number of major points that have already been discussed earlier. His reasons for the development of a modern control system are the same as Admiral Gorshkov's. He includes a quote from Gorshkov's May, 1980, article which was examined earlier.

Automated control systems are also discussed as being a very important part of the control system. Sysoyev again bases his comments on Admiral Gorshkov's May, 1980, article. He says that electronic computers and special control software have permitted the automation of decision-making and the creation of automated control systems. However, he also points out that one-man command and the personal responsibility of commanders at all levels for the decisions they make are important principles of control. This simply means that it is the commander who should make the decision, not the mathematical model.

The analysis of these articles has brought out some very important Soviet perceptions concerning command and control. The major points made in the articles examined are:

1. Modern day combat operations are characterized by large spatial scope, accelerated tempo and sharp variation in the situation during combat operations at sea.
2. Good command and control is essential.
3. Control systems must provide both centralized and decentralized control of forces.





4. Since the control problem is complex, quality control of forces can only be accomplished by automated control systems.

5. The basic purpose of automated control systems is to assist the commanding officer in making the most expedient decision.

The importance the Soviets place on command and control and the points listed above can be readily seen in the six articles viewed in this piece. This increase in the number and emphasis on command and control related articles started with a two-part series written by the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral S. Gorshkov. Gorshkov set the emphasis and his article was followed by other articles written by senior naval officers. All but one of the articles examined here were written by flag level officers.

Other related articles were published in Morskoy Sbornik after the Admiral Gorshkov series. These articles focused on specific areas of command and control; for example, in December, 1980, "On the Problem of Evaluating the Relative Strength of Opposing Forces" by Vice Admiral V. Babiyy and Captain 1st Rank N. Volgin and, in April, 1982, "Scientific Principles for Employing Automated Control of Forces" by Rear Admiral M. Iskanderov.

Another important observation is that all the major points emphasized in the articles are made by using the same (or nearly the same) phraseology. The three principal phrases used were: large spatial scope, accelerated tempo, and diverse situational variation.



This would seem to indicate that a unity of views is being established on certain basic ideas related to command and control. The idea of unity of views, as stated earlier, goes back to Russian political culture and is a requirement for the development of any doctrine or undertaking.

Articles relating to command and control in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik are nothing new; they can be found as far back as the early 1960's. However, a recent emphasis on command and control is indicated by the events discussed above. To review:

1. A major two-part series on command and control is published in Morskoy Sbornik which is authored by Admiral S. Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.
2. Admiral Gorshkov's series is followed by a number of other related articles, many of which are written by flag officers.
3. Each related article reemphasizes basically the same points made in the Gorshkov series.
4. The major points emphasized are made by using the same (or close to the same) phrases. This indicates an attempt to establish a unity of views.

#### C. THE COMMANDING OFFICER

Recently in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik, there has been a surge in the number of articles which concern the commanding officer. Articles on the topic are not new in the journal; however, there seems to be a renewed emphasis lately.

All of these articles naturally point out that the commanding officer is the key figure in the fleet. Diverse



and complex duties are imposed on him, and he is held strictly responsible for them. Because of the complex nature and conditions of modern warfare, the demands placed on the commanding officer are great.

The commanding officer is responsible for the combat readiness of his ship. This means that the training of the crew is of great importance. The commanding officer must be bold and decisive in his tactical plans. He must also be creative and not just use school book solutions. In this way, he can act independently when the situation arises.

Therefore, the education and training of commanding officers and future commanding officers is of great importance. Many of the articles make recommendations to improve what they perceive as deficiencies in the training of current and prospective commanding officers.

The surge in articles concerning commanding officers began in March, 1981, with "We Raise Commanding Officers" by Officer Ye. Chernov, Hero of the Soviet Union. Chernov notes that the commanding officer has a special place in achieving victory in modern naval warfare. He is the central figure in the navy and is held strictly accountable for the serious demands imposed upon him.

Contemporary naval warfare is fast-moving and highly dynamic, with abrupt changes in the situation. The commander must be able to quickly evaluate the situation, decide on a



plan, and use not only textbook but also new tactics. The ability to do this requires that he have a broad tactical and technical perspective, use the principles of military regulations and manuals skillfully, and be thoroughly familiar with the combat capabilities of both his and the enemy's ship.

Chernov views the work of preparing officers to fill positions as ship commanders as a complex and multifaceted process which is not always unified. He thinks that young officers are only trained for the next higher position without being taught those qualities which he will need later when he becomes a department head or executive officer. This sometimes results in a situation where an officer's training to be a ship commander does not begin until he is an executive officer, and this is too late.

The article includes an example of an officer with fifteen years of service who was considered unsuitable to command a ship. He satisfactorily performed his work at each successive position until he became the executive officer of a ship. There he did not demonstrate the necessary command qualities. The question being asked by the Soviets is, "Why not?"

The article does not state how often the situation described above occurs, but one gets the impression that it happens more than the Soviet Navy would like. The rest of the discussion outlines a program that will begin to prepare





officers to fill command positions at an early stage in their careers.

Chernov also comments that training continues even after an officer is given command. The primary objective is:

. . . to teach the commander to be a bold and decisive tactician with a thorough knowledge of the equipment and weapons, a skillful teacher of ideologically confirmed fighting men. The warship is designed for battle. The outcome of the battle depends first of all on the commander, on how he is able to make a plan and use the ship and crew entrusted to him to carry it out [Ref. 55].

The editors added a final note. They suggested that commanders and political officers share their working know-how in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik.

"The Commanding Officer's Principal Concern Is Combat Readiness" by Vice Admiral A. Kalinin was published in December, 1981. Vice Admiral Kalinin, first deputy commanding officer of the Baltic Fleet, makes many of the same points Chernov made in the previous article discussed. Kalinin comments on the commanding officer's position as the primary link to combat readiness and notes that he must answer to the people, the party, and the state.

The article discusses the complexities of contemporary naval warfare. It is characterized by highly technical equipment, rapid movement, dynamism, diverse situations and sudden, unexpected appearances by the enemy. Under such conditions, only a fearless, strong-willed officer who has developed his tactical thinking will be able to act with initiative.



Vice Admiral Kalinin views good training as very important in the development of commanding officers. Not only does it teach them technical and tactical knowledge, but it develops initiative and independence. However, the author notes that there are still cases where training is worked out in a simplistic manner without considering contemporary conditions and that there are ships where old training plans are copied over and over. He calls this a "chronic lag in combat training." Kalinin concludes by saying the officer training system must be aimed at training skilled, experienced commanding officers.

In January, 1982, Morskoy Sbornik published an article by Admiral Gorshkov. The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy's article, entitled "The Commanding Officer's Personal Example," is a piece which expounds on the qualities and duties of the commanding officer. He notes the commanding officer is "the key figure in the fleet," and that his responsibilities are affected by the constantly increasing scale and complexity of modern naval warfare.

The author comments that one can still find cases where commanding officers are failing in their duties because of the lack of knowledge and zealously and that the criteria for the selection of commanding officers must be strict.

A concern for the commanding officer's proper formation is a very important element in the making of a good commander. He must have the proper knowledge and understanding to carry



out his complex missions. Therefore, every effort must be made to create favorable conditions for the all around growth and formation of commanding officers. Gorshkov, noting cases of poor leadership, re-emphasizes the training and formation of commanding officers.

In August, 1982, an article entitled "Who Is to Be a CO?" by Fleet Admiral N. Smirnov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, was published. Smirnov refers to and re-emphasizes major points made in previously published articles concerning commanding officers.

The author states that the role of the commanding officer in the fleet has increased significantly in connection with the increasing complexity of equipment, armements and tactics, and that the task of training ship commander, the backbone and central figures of the officer corps, is of great importance. The Soviet Navy must give constant attention to the proper selection and training of commanding officers.

The author stresses that ship commanding officers and candidates for this position must display intelligent initiative and independence in accomplishing assigned missions. He views imagination and initiative as applied to naval warfare as the creation of tactics that are new in concept and execution but are based on established knowledge.

It is noted that poor professional training still occurs at various levels of an officer's career and that this is



the reason for mistakes and miscalculations. Proper professional training provides sufficient schooling to command and control ships, implement regulations and a sense of personal responsibility to get the job done.

Fleet Admiral Smirnov ends by stating that it is important to perform planned, purposeful work to train commanding officers, and that this discussion in Morskoy Sbornik is very important and requires further continuation.

The articles reviewed are only a few of those that were published in the journal Morskoy Sbornik concerning the commanding officer. Some of the others published are: "The Staff and Combat Activity of a Commanding Officer" by Admiral P. Naroytsev, February, 1982; "Teach CO's the Art of Warfare" by the editorial staff, February, 1982; and another editorial entitled "Tactical Proficiency Is an Index of the CO's Maturity," September, 1982. However, this is by no means a complete list.

There are several substantive threads which can be traced through all of the articles related to the commanding officer. These are:

1. The commanding officer is the key figure in the fleet.
2. Because of the complex nature and conditions of modern warfare, the demands placed on the commanding officer are great.
3. Commanding officers must be bold, decisive and independent.





4. Due to the failures of some commanding officers and candidate commanding officers, the officer training system in the Soviet Navy is being reviewed.

It is obvious from the articles being published in the journal that the Soviet Navy is not entirely satisfied with their officer training system. Writings concerning commanding officers are not rare in Morskoy Sbornik, but there seemed to be a steady increase in their number preceding Chernov's piece. After Chernov's article, which included a comment from the editorial staff inviting more opinions, the articles greatly increased.

The articles allude to a problem in the preparation of Soviet naval officers to assume a command position and the training of commanding officers once in the position. It seems that the junior officer is only prepared to fill the next higher position and that purposeful training with the ultimate objective of command is not being organized. This results in a situation where these officers are not being prepared for command until they are executive officers and this, they feel, is too late. The Soviet Navy seems to think there are too many cases where an officer rises to executive officer and then is considered unsatisfactory for a ship's command.

There are also cases where commanders fail in their duties. This is also considered to be caused by poor training. Sometimes it is blamed on the force commander's



training of his CO's. Two reasons seem to surface from the articles. First, the force commander does not give the CO a chance to act on his own; he is "coddling" the ship commander too much. Second, the force commander leaves the training plan to someone else who just recopies an old, outdated plan. In other words, they are just going through the motions.

Most of the articles are written by well known senior naval officers which seems to indicate the importance placed on the topic. Many of the articles invite further comment on how training can be improved to better prepare officers for command at sea. Even Admiral Gorshkov himself remarks that every effort must be made to upgrade all forms of training.

Each piece written on the subject seems to emphasize basically the same points and in the same way. Also note many of the same phrases are frequently used.

Because of the complex nature and conditions of modern warfare, great demands are placed on the commanding officer. In order to meet these challenges, the commanding officer must be bold, decisive and independent. Officers are not born with these traits; they must be developed.

The Soviet Navy perceives a problem in its preparation of officers for command because of the failures of some commanding officers and candidate commanding officers.



Therefore, the officer training system is being reviewed in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik.



## VI. SUMMARY

Morskoy Sbornik is a monthly naval journal which has been published since 1848. It is one of the oldest publications in the Soviet Union and was one of a very few from the czarist period which joined the Soviet Revolution.

During the early days of the Revolution, the journal concerned itself with the development of Soviet naval thinking based on the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The magazine also printed edicts of the Soviet authorities to help them further the cause of the Revolution.

On November 29, 1917, Morskoy Sbornik was placed under the control of the Naval General Staff. Thus, the journal became an official press organ of the Soviet Navy. Articles on military-political subjects, naval strategy and on foreign navies and their performance were printed. The magazine played an important part in shaping the views of Soviet officers.

Morskoy Sbornik's popularity is still growing. Its circulation has more than doubled in the last ten years. This is due to the editorial staff who remain responsive to the reader's needs and do everything possible to accomplish the magazine's missions.

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and Morskoy Sbornik are often compared. In some respects the substantive





articles in the Soviet journal are similar to those in Proceedings. Both are aimed at a readership larger than just naval officers (foreign as well as domestic). The two journals contain articles written by junior as well as senior officers and civilian specialists.

However, the differences between the two are of more importance. While Proceedings is a private publication (not part of the U.S. Navy Department), Morskoy Sbornik is an official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Navy. As an official organ, Morskoy Sbornik is under the direct control of the Navy Military Council. The council assigns tasks and indicates ways in which they can be accomplished. The Soviet journal is also rigidly censored by the Central Political Administration of the Soviet Navy.

Some divergences peculiar to the Soviet journal are: the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology, importance of history, basing articles on the foreign press, and very few open disagreements.

Morskoy Sbornik has three basic missions. First is to foster a unity of views on the character and form of waging a war at sea. Second is a forum for discussion and debate, and third is the dissemination of useful information. Great efforts are being made by the journal and Naval Military Council to ensure these missions are being accomplished.



By careful examination, one may gain a great deal of information on Soviet views from the pages of Morskoy Sbornik. Analysis of the number of articles, authors, intensity of tone, and phraseology will uncover many Soviet thoughts and views.

Morskoy Sbornik is a professional naval journal which serves the CPSU and Soviet Navy well.



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